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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three chapters that are related to the research topics in Urban and
Regional Economics. The first chapter examines whether economic self-interest associated with
homeownership motivates homeowners to vote more than renters in U.S. local elections. To
control for the self-selection of homeownership, I use national election turnout as the
counterfactual outcome. Since policy discussions in national elections are targeted more at the
national level, the disparity in political participation between homeowners and renters should be
reduced. Results based on election data from three U.S. cities confirm these hypothesis, which
suggest that local policies may tend to cater to the tastes of homeowners over renters. The second
chapter develops a new method to identify and control for selection when estimating the
productivity effects of city size. For single peaked factor return distributions, selecting out lowperforming agents has limited effect on modal productivity but reduces the CDF evaluated at the
mode. Spillovers from agglomeration have the reverse effect. Estimates based on law firm
productivity, wages for married women and wages for full-time men all confirm that selection
contributes to urban productivity and that doubling city size causes productivity to increase by 12.5 percent. The last chapter uses border discontinuity design to study the long-run effect of
British colonial rule on the state building in Africa. British colonial legacy is featured with ethnic
segregation and stronger executive constraints, which may have undermined state centralisation.
Using micro-data from anglophone and francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we find
that anglophone citizens are less likely to identify themselves in national terms (relative to ethnic
terms). Evidence on taxation, security and the power of chiefs also suggests weaker state
capacity in anglophone countries. These results highlight the legacy of colonial rule on statebuilding.
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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that economic self-interest associated with homeownership affects
voter turnout in local elections in the United States. Compared to renters, homeowners are
financially invested in their communities and are less mobile. Therefore, homeowners should
care more about local policies and have incentives to engage actively in local politics. The
disparity in political participation between homeowners and renters, however, should diminish in
presidential elections for which policy discussions are more targeted at the national-level. These
hypotheses are tested using block-level election panel data. Fixed effects models and a control
function approach are used to identify the effect of homeownership on voter turnout in off-year
mayoral elections relative to presidential elections. Results show that mayoral election voter
turnout increases with the local homeownership rate. This suggests that local policies may tend
to cater to the tastes of homeowners over renters.

JEL Classification: R2, R3, D72

Key words: homeownership, voter turnout, local election.
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1. Introduction
Local governments in the United States are the primary provider of local public goods and
enact zoning laws that affect allowable patterns of land use. Collectively, local government
expenditures also account for one-tenth of U.S. GDP and local governments collect as much in tax
revenue as the federal government (Oliver et al., 2012). Nevertheless, compared to national-level
elections, U.S. local races often have very low voter turnout. Table 1 summarizes mayoral and
presidential election turnout rates from Philadelphia, Seattle and Chicago over the period between
2003 and 2013 (with turnout rates measured at the census block group level).1 While presidential
election turnout averages roughly 60%, mayoral election turnout is much lower, ranging from 20%
to 40%. Turnout rate variation across census blocks – measured by standard deviation divided by
the mean – is also higher in mayoral races. Given local government’s consequential role, the
limited turnout in local elections is a source of concern. The reason is that voter turnout could
affect how local governments enact policies and whether local policies are representative of the
electorate (Hajnal and Trounstine, 2005; 2010).
The question of why voter turnout is so low in local elections is related to the literature on
the homevoter hypothesis (Fischel, 2001; Brunner et al., 2001; Brunner and Sonstelie, 2003;
Dehring et al., 2008; Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Ahlfeldt, 2011; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015).
Previous studies by Fischel (2001) and others have examined how capitalization effects associated
with local policies may affect home-voters preferences over local policy initiatives as compared
to lease-voters. That literature, however, has largely overlooked related effects on local election
turnout. This paper fills that gap by providing evidence that voter turnout in local elections is
driven in part by voter economic self-interest related to homeownership status.

1

For each city, the statistics are organized into three election cycles and the election cycles are four years apart.

3

For two reasons, homeowners have stronger economic incentives to vote in mayoral
elections relative to renters. From an investment perspective, the value of a homeowner’s house –
the largest investment for most U.S. households2 – is tied to local fiscal services and amenities
provided by the municipal government (Rosen, 1974; Ross and Yinger, 1999; Yinger, 2015). From
a consumption perspective, homeowners are also less mobile and hence receive longer utility flows
from local public goods. Renters, in contrast, are less financially invested in their communities and
more mobile (Rosenthal, 1988; Ioannides and Kan, 1996). Therefore, renters are less likely to
internalize the long run effect of their local political decisions and have less incentive to vote in
local elections.
The empirical challenge in this paper is to identify the causal effects of homeownership on
mayoral election voter turnout. It has been widely recognized that homeownership and political
participation may be endogenously correlated (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Keyssar, 2009;
Engelhardt et al., 2010). Failing to control for unobserved confounders may bias estimates of the
effect of the owner-occupancy rate on voter turnout.3 To address the endogeneity concern, I use
two strategies to control for census block level unobservables, a block-level fixed effects model
and a control function approach. Both models use presidential elections as the counterfactual.
National-level elections and related policy initiatives are by definition less focused on local
issues, the provision of local public goods, and local property values. For that reason, and drawing

2

According to a report by The Federal Reserve Board, even at the bottom of 2008 housing crisis, housing wealth
still counts as one-half of the total household net wealth in the United States. For the median household, housing
wealth counts for almost two-thirds of their total wealth. Link:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1027/ifdp1027.htm
3
There has been a few attempts in the literature to address the endogeneity. For instance, DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1999) instruments individual homeownership using group-average homeownership rates from the corresponding
socio-demographic groups. However, their instrument is far from perfect since individual unobservables may
correlate with membership to a socio-demographic group. Engelhardt et al. (2010) exploits the random assignment
of home-purchase subsidies to low-income renters in a field experiment conducted in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Despite a
cleaner study design, their sample is not representative of the general population and the sample size is limited.

4

on capitalization arguments from the homevoter literature, homeowners and renters should display
more similar tendencies to vote in national elections relative to local elections, all else equal. Hence
in a well-specified model, block-level homeownership rates should not be correlated with
presidential election turnout provided one sufficiently controls for socioeconomic differences
between homeowners and renters.
In the fixed effects models to follow, I assume that the census block confounders are timeinvariant. After differencing away time-invariant unobserved confounders, the homeownership
rate strongly affects mayoral election turnout but does not affect presidential election turnout. The
sharp differences in estimates for mayoral and presidential elections provide evidence that
economic incentives contribute to voter turnout and motivate homeowners to be more likely to
vote in mayoral elections than renters.4
One may argue against the assumption that the block-level confounders are time-invariant.
Relaxing this assumption motivates my second identification strategy – the control function (CF)
approach. I directly model the time-varying confounders in mayoral regressions as a function of
presidential election turnout rate. To obtain identification, the CF approach imposes other
moderate assumptions that are clarified later in the paper. Empirically the two models deliver very
similar estimates.
An interpretation of my identification strategies is that, by controlling for block-level
unobservables, both models indirectly absorb individual-level confounders that contribute to
residential sorting. According to the Tiebout sorting theory, households may sort into

4

That interpretation is further strengthened by including household mobility contorls (principally census-block
residential turnover rates) into the model to help separate investment and consumption motives for voter turnout.
Several other time-varying census block level socioeconomic attributes are also taken into account, including
income, education, age distribution and share of households that are married. As noted above, the most robust
models include block-level fixed effects and identify off of within-block temporal variation in the data.
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neighborhoods according to their needs and willingness to pay for local public amenities (Tiebout,
1956). In a sorting equilibrium, homeowners and renters living in the same neighborhood share
lots of similar characteristics. Therefore, census block-level unobserved attributes may correlate
with the individual characteristics that cause the endogenous correlation between homeownership
and voter turnout.5
To conduct the analysis, I assembled a novel election panel data for Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Seattle over the period between 2002 and 2013. My key specification shows that when a census
block switches from fully rental into fully owner-occupied, its mayoral election turnout rate will
increase by approximately five percentage points, which is equivalent to a 23 percent increase
compared to the mean. The tenure composition change does not affect presidential election turnout.
Results from this paper suggest that renters are under-represented in U.S. local elections.
As renters participate less in local races due to insufficient economic self-interest, local politicians
may design policies to please the high turnout group – homeowners – to gain electoral support.6
Such favoritism may lead to policies protecting property value appreciation (e.g. strict zoning
laws). Glaeser et al. (2005) points out that change in land regulation regime explains the scarcity
of house development in the most expensive U.S. housing market. Ortalo-Magn and Prat (2014)
theorizes how homeowners affect urban growth control through the local political process. Total
social welfare may also be impaired by the tightening housing supply as it impedes an efficient
spatial allocation of labor (Hsieh and Moretti, 2015).

5

Indeed, Minkoff (2014) finds that the quality of city-provided public goods in a community is highly correlated
with residents’ tendency to vote in New York City.
6
In San Francisco, a city with a roughly thirty-five percent owner-occupancy rate, households organize into
hundreds of politically powerful neighborhood groups (e.g., Telegraph Hill Dwellers) to promote policies limiting
new house development. See Kim-Mai Cutler, “How Burrowing Owls Lead To Vomiting Anarchists (Or SF’s
Housing Crisis Explained)”, TechCrunch, April 2014. Link: http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/14/sf-housing/

6

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed discussion
of the empirical specializations and identification strategies. Section 3 provides a description of
the data source and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness
check. Then the paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 5.

2. Empirical Specification and Identification
The basic empirical specification is given as follows:

!"#$%"& (&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 =

45 + 75 × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2
+D /,1,2 ′FG + ./,1,2

(1)

in which H indexes census blocks, * cities and + election cycles. Coefficient 75 measures the
impact of owner-occupancy rate on mayoral election voter turnout. This paper attempts to obtain
an unbiased estimator of 75 . Vector D /,1,2 represents census block level observables that may
correlate with owner-occupancy rate and mayoral election turnout.
The first control to be included in D /,1,2 is the residential mobility measure. As described
in the introduction, owning a property makes homeowners have a higher financial stake in the
community as well as be less mobile. Staying put means homeowners enjoy a longer utility flow
from local public good. This may also motivate them to vote in local elections to affect public
goods provision.7 Controlling for the residential mobility measure aims to separate the effect of
investment and consumption motive on voter turnout. However, there is no direct measure of

7

One may also suspect that moving too frequently may bring hurdle to voter registration and thus depress election
turnout. Given the fact that voter registration deadline for most States is 15 – 30 days before the Election day, as
long as the majority of the movers do not frequently move immediately before the Election day, the effect of
mobility on voter registration should be small.

7

residential mobility at census block level. I use census block turnover rate – the share of residents
moving into the neighborhood within past 12 months – as a proxy for the mobility measure, by
assuming that people living in high turnover neighborhoods are in general more mobile. Being
aware that the turnover rate is not an adequate mobility measure, I also rely on other covariates to
be introduced later to control for residential mobility. In a comprehensive review, Molloy et al.
(2011) shows that U.S. residential mobility is closely tied to demographic attributes such as
education or age.
The second control is the household median income. According to an analysis done by the
real estate database company Zillow8, owner-occupancy rate almost monotonically increases with
household income. Meanwhile, higher income may have a negative impact on voter turnout.
Charles and Stephens (2013) shows that higher labor income discourages voter turnout because
higher hourly wages implies higher opportunity cost of going to the poll. The third control is the
education distribution. Homeownership is highly correlated with education according to a report
from First American Financial Corporation.9 Numerous studies also find that education is a strong
driver of election turnout (Sondheimer and Green, 2010; Burden, 2009). Looking at residents 25
years old or above, I generate the share of residents having a high school degree or some college
and the share of residents with at least a bachelor’s degree. These two variables jointly measure
the education distribution of the census block. The fourth control is the share of married household.
It has been found that marriage is closely linked to the first-time transition into homeownership
(Smits and Mulder, 2008). Marriage may affect turnout through a complex web of channels. For
instance, marriage may depress turnout if married couples need to spend time with their children
at home, which prevents them from going to the polls. On the other hand, if couples have school-

8
9

Link: http://www.zillow.com/research/homeownership-by-income-9419/
Link: http://www.firstam.com/economics/homeownership-progress-index/
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aged children that they drop off to school and the polling stations are close to local schools, it
might be convenient for them to vote. In this case, marriage may increase voter turnout.10 The last
control is the age distribution. Age is another strong predictor of homeownership and it is well
documented in the voting literature that propensity to vote increases with age (Blais, 2000;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). I use the share of adults between 30 and 60 years old and the
share of adults above 60 years old to jointly measure the age distribution of the census block.
After controlling for the observed block-level attributes, standard OLS theory shows that
the estimator of 75 is unbiased if owner-occupancy rate and the remaining error term ./,1,2 are
independent. Nevertheless, ./,1,2 may still contain unobserved confounders that are correlated
with owner-occupancy rate. I further decompose ./,1,2 = I5 J/,1,2 + K/,1,2 and define J/,1,2 as
the unobserved block-level confounders. Coefficient I5 measures the correlation between the
confounders and mayoral election turnout. Since J/,1,2 is unobserved to the researcher, this paper
uses two strategies to control for it.

2.1. Fixed Effects Model
The first approach exploits the panel structure of the data. Assuming that the unobserved
confounders are time-invariant, I use a fixed effects model to absorb the unobservables. Replacing
J/,1,2 by J/,1 , Equation (1) can be written as:

!"#$%"& (&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 =

45 + 75 × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2
+D /,1,2 ′FG + I5 J/,1 + L2 + K/,1,2

10

(2)

One may argue that it is the existence of school-aged children that matters for married households, since families
with children may care more about local public goods provision (such as police, sidewalks, school quality, and so
forth.) and therefore more likely to vote. Empirically I find that controlling the share of households with school-aged
children instead of the share of married household does not affect the result.

9

in which I also include election-cycle fixed effects L2 to capture time trend in the data. After the
unobservables being absorbed by block-level fixed effects, an unbiased estimator of 75 can be
obtained.
The identification assumption in the fixed effects model is that the unobserved confounders
are time-invariant. To support this assumption, I use presidential election outcome as a
counterfactual. Since national politics are less relevant to property value and local public good
provision, the disparate incentive to vote between homeowners and renters should be reduced.
Therefore, if the fixed effects can absorb block-level unobserved confounders, homeownership
rate should not drive presidential election turnout in a fixed effects model. Replacing the dependent
variable in Equation (2) with presidential election turnout, I have:

M%)N,O)-+,"& (&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 = 4P + 7P × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2
+D /,1,2 ′FQ + IP J/,1 + L2 + K/,1,2

(3)

In Equation (3), the same time-invariant confounder term J/,1 may correlate with owneroccupancy rate and thus generates an endogeneous correlation between owner-occupancy rate and
presidential election turnout. Coefficient IP captures the effect of unobservables on presidential
election turnout and it is allowed to be different from I5 in Equation (2). Coefficient 7P
measures the impact of owner-occupancy rate on presidential election turnout. As will be shown
in the empirical section, 7P becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero once the fixed
effects are introduced.

10

2.2. Control Function Approach
One may argue against the assumption that the block-level confounders are time-invariant.
Relaxing this assumption motivates my second identification strategy – the control function (CF)
approach. The basic idea of a CF approach is to control for the unobservables in the error term by
modeling them directly (Wooldridge, 2015). Since I can observe turnout rates from both mayoral
and presidential elections, I can re-write the confounder term J/,1,2 in mayoral election regression
as a function of presidential election turnout rate. To better explain the CF approach, I rewrite
Equation (2) and (3) as:

!"#$%"& )&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 = 45 + 75 × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2
+I5 J/,1,2 + K/,1,2

(4)

and

M%)N,O)-+,"& )&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 = 4P + 7P × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2
+IP J/,1,2 + K/,1,2

(5)

Vector D /,1,2 is dropped for simplicity. The confounder term J/,1,2 enters both equations
and is allowed to have heterogeneous impact across elections (measured by I5 and IP
repectively). My coefficient of interest is 75 , which measures the impact of owner-occupancy
rate on mayoral election turnout. Notice that neither 75 or 7P can be estimated without bias
because J/,1,2 is unobserved. Rearranging Equation (5), I can write J/,1,2 as a function of the
M%)N,O)-+,"& )&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 . Plugging the new expression of J/,1,2 into Equation (4), I
arrive at:
11

!"#$%"& )&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 = R + (75 −

UV
UW

7P ) × 9:-)r_occupancy %"+)/,1,2

(6)

U

+ UV M%)N,O)-+,"& )&)*+,$- +.%-$.+/,1,2 + Y/,1,2
W

Z

in which R = 45 − UW and Y/,1,2 = (1 −
W

UV
UW

)K/,1,2 . Now all the controls in Equation (6) can be

observed from the data. More important, the owner-occupancy rate is independent from the new
error term. Therefore, I can obtain an unbiased estimator of the coefficient 75 −

UV
UW

7P . This is

the difference between my coefficient of interest 75 and a scaled version of 7P . Before
introducing the identification assumptions, let me briefly discuss the scale parameter
that although

UV
UW

UV
UW

. Notice

also appears as the coefficient of presidential election turnout rate, it cannot be

estimated without bias because the presidential election turnout is correlated with the error term
by construction. It is reasonable to presume that the sign of

UV
UW

to be positive since I5 and IP

measure the endogenous correlation between owner-occupancy rate and election turnout rates. In
the empirical section, I find that the estimate of

UV
UW

is approximately 0.45 and it remains stable in

all specifications.
To identify 75 , I need to make one of the two alternative assumptions. One option is
assuming 7P = 0. In this case 75 −

UV
UW

7P = 75 , so that an OLS regression based on Equation

(6) returns the unbiased estimate of 75 . The other option is assuming 7P to be non-negative.
Under this weaker assumption I can identify the lower bound of 75 given the fact that

UV
UW

is

positive. Both assumptions imply that conditional on J/,1,2 the owner-occupancy rate has a
negligible effect on presidential election turnout. Neither of these assumptions is restrictive.
According to the fixed effects model estimation results to be shown in Section 4.1, the correlation
12

between owner-occupancy rate and presidential election turnout is not statistically different from
zero. Since CF approach further allows J/,1,2 to be time-varying, this more flexible specification
should further push 7P to be close to zero. Therefore, depending on which assumption one is
willing to make, either 75 or its lower bound is identified.11 For the ease of discussion, I assume
that 7P = 0, therefore 75 can be identified from an OLS regression using Equation (6).

3. Data and Summary Statistics
This paper draws upon data from the U.S. Census and election databases from Philadelphia,
Chicago, and Seattle. Municipal governments from these three cities digitized their precinct-level
election returns from 2002 onward and published them online (see Appendix A for details). The
election database reports election type, candidate information, and vote counts for local, state, and
federal elections. It also includes records from various idiosyncratic local ballots.
Now I discuss the reasons to choose mayoral and presidential elections as the focus of this
study. First, my main identification strategy relies upon using fixed effects to absorb block-level
time-invariant confounders. Hence I need to look at elections that were held for multiple times.
Second, choosing elections that are common for all three cities allows me to pool data together to
improve estimation precision. Presidential elections are a natural candidate for national elections
since they are held every four years and are universal for all residents living in the United States.
For local elections, I chose mayoral elections because all three cities have the same mayor-council
(as opposed to council-manager) governance system that allows city residents to elect their mayors
directly. Additionally, all three cities hold their mayoral elections in odd–numbered years (off–

11

Identification fails only when owner-occupancy rate has a notable negative impact on presidential election
turnout. In that case the estimated coefficient is an upper bound of 75 . However, based on the empirical results in
Section 4.1 I can rule out this scenario.
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year elections) so that the mayoral election turnout is not affected by presidential election turnout
(Levonyan, 2013). Another potential candidate for local election is the city-council election. In my
data, the city-council and the mayoral election turnout rates are close because they are held at the
same time. Voters, given that the marginal cost of participating in city-council elections is zero
conditional on already voted in a mayoral race, usually cast votes for both elections. Since mayor
tends to be a more viable political player in the mayor-council system (Holbrook and Weinschenk,
2013) and it is the local executive parallel to the U.S. chief executive, this paper focuses on mayoral
election results. Other elections such as gubernatorial or congressional elections are not as relevant
for local policy as mayoral elections and are therefore not considered in the analysis.
I group the election turnout data into three election cycles according to chronological order.
Each election cycle contains a mayoral election and a presidential election that is one year apart.
Between 2002 and 2015, Philadelphia and Chicago held mayoral elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011;
Seattle held mayoral elections in 2005, 2009 and 2013. Correspondingly, there are three
presidential elections in 2004, 2008 and 2012. The first three columns in Table 2 summarizes the
election grouping. For instance, the first election cycle includes 2003 Philly, 2003 Chicago, and
2005 Seattle mayoral elections as well as the 2004 presidential election from these three cities.
To merge the election data with the Census data, I map the raw precinct-level voting
records into census blocks (2010 definition) using a crosswalk from the Missouri Census Data
Center.12 Census blocks are the smallest geographic unit for which the Census publishes its data.
A census block typically has a population between 600 and 3,000. The average census block
population size is 1,000 for the three cities. Voting precincts are slightly smaller than census blocks

12

http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html
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geographically. In Philadelphia, 1,686 precincts are mapped into 1,333 blocks. In Chicago, 2,571
precincts are mapped into 2,171 blocks and, in Seattle, 960 precincts are mapped into 479 blocks.
Census data at the block level is accessible from two Census data products: the Decennial
Census and the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year-estimates. The main difference
between them is that the Decennial Census provides data gathered at a “point of time” while ACS
produces estimates using data gathered within a “period of time”. Since socio-demographic
attributes of small geographic areas are likely to remain constant within a 5-year time window,
ACS 5-year-estimates are designed to provide estimates describing the average attributes of an
area over the corresponding time period.13 Moreover, Decennial Census data is available once per
decade while ACS 5–year–estimates have more frequent time coverage. 14 The data merging
between election panel and Census data is summarized in Table 2 Column (3). There is no
corresponding Census data coverage for elections held during the first election cycle (2003 to
2005). Hence I approximate the block-level attributes during this period by taking the average
between 2000 Decennial Census data and ACS 2005 – 2009 5–year–estimates.15 For election data
from the second and the third election cycles, I merge them with Census data from ACS 2006 2010 5-year-estimates and ACS 2010 - 2014 5-year-estimates, respectively.16

13

For more information of ACS data, please look at the “A Compass for Understanding and Using American
Community Survey Data” document prepared by Census.
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/acs/handouts/Compass_Appendix.pdf
14
Currently ACS has 6 rounds of 5–year–estimates available: 2005 – 2009, 2006 – 2010, 2007 – 2011, 2008 –
2012, 2009 – 2013, 2010 – 2014.
15
The approximation can be done for all variables except the neighborhood turnover rate, which measures share of
residents moved into the neighborhood within past 12 months. It is available in ACS data but not in 2000 Decennial
Census, which only provides the share of residents moved into the neighborhood within past five years.
Neighborhood turnover rate appears to have a slightly downward trend over the years. It is mean value decreases
from 0.165 in 2005 - 2009 round data to 0.158 in 2010-2014 round data. One option for obtaining approximation is
extrapolating the original sequence by assuming linearity. Since the estimation will include election cycle fixed
effects which can take care any form of linear/non-linear trend in variables, this paper directly uses 2005 - 2009 data
to proximate the neighborhood turnover rate in first election cycle.
16
All the data merging is based on the 2010 geographic definitions of census blocks. However, 2000 Decennial
Census and ACS 2005-2009 5-year-estimates files are coded using 2000 census blocks boundaries while other years
ACS data are coded using 2010 census blocks boundaries. The Census Bureau does not provide correspondence file
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The block-level voter turnout rate is measured by the total number of votes over the size of
voting age population (United States citizens 18 years of age or older) in the block.17 Due to
sampling error in voting age population estimation, there are some blocks with turnout rates larger
than one. The empirical analysis to follow, I only use census block samples in which the turnout
rate is never larger than one. For instance, if block A has a turnout rate larger than one in election
cycle three’s presidential election, all records from block A are dropped. After dropping those
census blocks I obtain a balanced election panel in which each election cycle is composed of 1,129
Philadelphia census blocks, 1,874 Chicago census blocks and 377 Seattle census blocks. In the
robustness checks, I show that all results hold using the original full sample, as well as to as when
restricting the sample to blocks with turnout rates between 5% and 95%.
Table 3 provides mean, median and standard deviation for homeownership rate and turnout
in mayoral and presidential elections. The first thing to notice is that in each of the cells the mean
and median are close to each other, indicating that the turnout rates do not have a skewed
distribution. Compared to presidential election turnout, mayoral election turnout is lower.

4. Empirical Results
4.1. Fixed Effects Model
The empirical evidence from the fixed effects model is presented in three parts. First, I
present estimation results from Equation (2) and (3). This allows me to compare the effect of
owner-occupancy rate on mayoral elections (7]5 ) versus on presidential elections (7]P ). Second, I

to link the 2000 census blocks to the 2010 census blocks. Therefore, I build correspondence file between 2000 and
2010 census blocks using GIS software (see Appendix B for detailed GIS work description).
17
Voting age population estimates are obtained from a separate tabulation from 2000 Decennial Census and the
“Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP)” estimates from the ACS 5-year-estimates. See Appendix
C for details.
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statistically test the coefficient difference between 7]5 and 7]P by pooling mayoral and
presidential elections data together to run regression with interaction terms. Last, I present further
evidence of obtaining identification using the fixed effects model.
Table 4 presents estimation results based on Equation (2) which uses mayoral election
turnout rate as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the census block
level to account for time series correlation. The first column shows the raw correlation between
owner-occupancy rate and mayoral election turnout. City fixed effects are added to account for
city-level heterogeneity. The coefficient on the owner-occupancy rate is positive and significant.
It indicates that when a block switches from fully rental into fully owner-occupied, its mayoral
election turnout rate increases by 19.7 percentage points, which is almost a 70 percent increase
relative to the mean.
Column (2) adds in the mobility control. Not surprisingly, controlling for neighborhood
turnover rate drives down the owner-occupancy rate coefficient because it separates the two
channels through which homeownership affects voter turnout. Homeowners may be more likely
to vote locally because: (a) they have higher financial stakes in the community, (b) they are less
mobile so they enjoy a longer utility flow from local public goods. With the mobility control, the
coefficient on owner-occupancy rate declines from 0.197 to 0.158. The negative coefficient on the
mobility control is consistent with the idea that mobile residents have less incentive to participate
in local elections.
Column (3) substitutes city fixed effects with census block fixed effects. Fixed effects
absorb time-invariant census block unobserved confounders that may cause an endogenous
correlation between homeownership rate and voter turnout. In the census block fixed effects model,
coefficient estimates on owner-occupancy rate and mobility control both decrease. Finally,
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Column (4) brings the full set of census block controls. Owner-occupancy rate still has a notable
impact on mayoral election turnout. Holding all else equal, if a block a block switches from fully
rental into fully owner-occupied, its mayoral turnout rate increases by 4.7 percentage points. This
is equivalent to a 23 percent increase compared to the mean. The coefficient on the mobility control
dropped considerably in Column (4). This is unsurprising because mobility is highly correlated
with demographic controls such as age and marital status (Molloy et al., 2011). Therefore,
variation in the mobility control is partially captured by other variables. The coefficient on
household median income confirms the results in Charles and Stephens (2013). Census blocks
with higher median household income have lower turnout rate. The coefficients on education
distribution show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between education attainment and
voter turnout. Compared to residents with less than a high school degree, the share of residents
with high school or some college is negatively correlated with turnout while the share of residents
with at least a college degree positively correlates with voter turnout. The share of married
households does not seem to have a significant correlation with mayoral election turnout. The age
distribution coefficients indicate that voter turnout is positively correlated with voter age. Adults
above 60 years old have strongest tendency to vote among all groups.
Columns (5) - (8) follow the same specifications as in Columns (1) - (4) but use the log of
mayoral election turnout rate as the dependent variable. Transformation into logarithms serves two
purposes. First, it accounts for potential non-linearity between voter turnout and the control
variables. Second, it allows for the slope coefficients to be interpreted as percentage changes in
the turnout rate. This helps to compare mayoral election results to the presidential ones because
the two elections have different turnout averages. A similar pattern repeats in the non-linear model.
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The owner-occupancy rate remain remains positive and significant in all columns. And the
estimated coefficient on the mobility control becomes noisy as more controls are added.
Having established that owner-occupancy rate drives mayoral elections turnout in a fixed
effects model, I move to the benchmark presidential election results in Table 5. The first column
of Table 5 presents the raw correlation between owner-occupancy rate and presidential election
turnout rate. According to the coefficient estimate, when a block switches from fully rental into
fully owner-occupied, its presidential election turnout increases by 9.6 percentage points. This is
a 17.5 percent increase compared to the average presidential turnout rate. Adding in mobility
controls in Column (2) does not change the owner-occupancy rate coefficient by much. In Column
(3), replacing city fixed effects with census block fixed effects erases the previously significant
coefficient on owner-occupancy rate. Block fixed effects capture the endogenous correlation
between homeownership and presidential election turnout. The fixed effects also reduce the
coefficient on the mobility control. People’s tendency to vote in the presidential election should
not be affected by how mobile they are since national policies affect the well-being of all residents
in the country. Including the full set of control in Column (4) does not result in any further changes
in the owner-occupancy rate coefficient.
Column (4) from Table 4 and Column (4) from Table 5 offer a sharp comparison. After
addressing the endogeneity concern using fixed effects, owner-occupancy rate is a strong driver of
mayoral election turnout but not presidential election turnout. The same sharp contrast also holds
using the log of election turnout as the dependent variable. After adding in census block fixed
effects, the homeownership effect on presidential election turnout vanishes in Column (7) and (8)
in Table 5. These results confirm the hypothesis that, compared to renters, homeowners are more
likely to vote in local elections due to economic incentives.
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Then I pool mayoral and presidential elections data together to statistically test the
coefficient difference between 7]5 and 7]P . I define a mayoral election dummy – equaling 1 for
data from mayoral elections and 0 for data from presidential elections. I regress voter turnout on
the mayoral dummy, the owner-occupancy rate, the interaction term between the two, other
controls, fixed effects, and interactions between the mayoral dummy and each of the
aforementioned controls. Table 6 summarizes the pooled regression results. As before, Columns
(1) - (3) use turnout rate as the dependent variable and Columns (4) - (6) use the log of turnout rate
as the dependent variable. The first row reports the coefficient on the interaction term between the
mayoral dummy and the owner-occupancy rate. It measures the difference between 7]5 and 7]P .
A positive estimate indicates that 7]5 is larger than 7]P . In all specifications, the interaction
coefficient estimates remain positive and significant. This implies owner-occupancy rate is a
strong driver of mayoral election turnout as opposed to presidential election turnout. The second
row reports the coefficient on the mayoral dummy. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient is negative in
all columns since mayoral elections have lower turnout rates. The third row presents the effect of
owner-occupancy

rate

on

presidential

turnout.

The

coefficient

remains

statistically

indistinguishable from zero in most columns. It becomes negative in Columns (2) and (5), but the
effect goes away with a full set of controls in Columns (3) and (6). Results from Table 6 confirm
the previous findings.
Last, I provide further evidence of using the fixed effects model to obtain identification.
As discussed in the introduction, one interpretation of controlling for block-level unobserved
attributes is that it indirectly absorbs personal confounders that contribute to residential sorting. If
individuals sort into narrowly defined geographic areas, a coarsely defined geographic fixed effect
should not be able to correct the endogeneity bias. This implies that, by substituting for
20

geographically refined fixed effects with geographically broader fixed effects, the endogenous
correlation between owner-occupancy rate and voter turnout should emerge. In this paper, the most
refined geographic level is a census block. The mean size of census blocks in the data is around
1,000 residents, approximately the size of a U.S. city neighborhood (roughly two to three street
blocks in densely developed urban areas). A natural choice for a geographic unit that is coarser
than a census block yet more refined than a city is the census tract. A census tract is usually
composed of three to four census blocks. At the tract level, uneven distribution of public goods
and amenities also exists. Massey (2001) demonstrates that the tract-level “Dissimilarity index”18
is relatively high in both Philadelphia and Chicago (Seattle is not covered in their study). The
census tract fixed effects are therefore well suited for an alternative specification using a broader
geographic measure. Beyond census tracts, I use city fixed effects as the coarsest geographic unit
control.
Table 7 summarizes the findings with different levels of fixed effects. Panel A uses only
the mayoral election data while Panel B uses only the presidential election data. The full set of
block-level controls is included in all specifications. Only the coefficient estimates on owneroccupancy rate are reported. Starting from Panel A, Column (1) presents the raw correlation
between owner-occupancy rate and mayoral election turnout rate conditional on block attributes.
Adding election cycle fixed effects in Column (2) brings limited change. Column (3) further adds
city fixed effects and the coefficient largely remains stable. Column (4) substitutes city fixed
effects with census tract fixed effects, and the coefficient declines almost by nearly half, from
0.117 to 0.060. Column (5) substitutes census tract fixed effects with the more refined census block
fixed effects, and the coefficient declines further. The same pattern also holds from Columns (6) -

18

“Dissimilarity index” measures is the relative number of Blacks who would have to change geographic units so
that an even Black-White spatial distribution could be achieved
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(10) using the log turnout rate as the dependent variable. In Panel B, which uses presidential
elections data, we also observe a similar declining pattern in the coefficients. Most importantly, as
I control for the most refined census block fixed effects, the correlation between owner-occupancy
rate and presidential election turnout vanishes. This pattern is in line with the assumption that
refined geographic fixed effects can absorb unobserved personal confounders associated with
residential sorting. The residential sorting effect is weaker at a broader geographic level, thereby
the broader fixed effects fail to capture the endogenous relationship between homeownership and
voter turnout.

4.2. Control Function Approach
The CF specification is given by Equation (6). Compared to the fixed effects model, the
CF approach allows the block-level confounders to be time-varying. As discussed in Section 2.2,
in this more flexible specification owner-occupancy rate should have limited impact on
presidential election turnout. By assuming 7P = 0, I can identify 75 which measures the causal
impact of owner-occupancy rate on mayoral election turnout. To increase estimation precision, I
pool the mayoral election records from all cities and election cycles together. City by election cycle
fixed effects are included into the models to account for heterogeneity across city and time.
Table 8 presents the CF approach estimation results. Column (1) only includes owneroccupancy rate and neighborhood turnover rate as controls. The signs on both coefficients are
consistent with previous findings from the fixed effects model. Column (2) adds presidential
election turnout rate to control for unobserved confounders. Consistent with my expectation, the
inclusion of presidential election turnout drives down the coefficient estimate on owner-occupancy
rate. The coefficient estimate on neighborhood turnover rate also decreases. Similarly, the
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coefficient on the neighborhood turnover rate measures the differential impact of mobility on voter
turnout in mayoral elections versus in presidential elections (scaled by

UV
UW

). How to interpret this

coefficient depends on the assumptions one is willing to make. My goal of including the
neighborhood turnover rate is to control for mobility, therefore I do not make extra assumptions
to interpret this coefficient. The coefficient estimate on presidential election turnout is close to
0.45.
Column (3) adds the remaining census block controls into the regression. The coefficients
for these controls are not reported for the same reason as with the neighborhood turnover rate. As
the result shows, conditional on mobility and other controls, the coefficient estimate on owneroccupancy rate 7]5 is 0.05. This is close to the 0.046 estimate obtained from the fixed effects
model (Table 4 Column (4)). The coefficient estimate on presidential election turnout remains
stable. Similar patterns are found in the non-linear models in Columns (4) - (6) that use log of
mayoral election turnout as dependent variable. Results from the CF approach confirm the
previous findings from the fixed effects model.

4.3. Robustness Check
I conduct four robustness checks for both the fixed effects model and the CF approach.
First, I drop census blocks located near major universities (U Penn, U Chicago and U of
Washington) because those blocks contain a higher proportion of international students (non-U.S.
citizens) which cannot be distinguished from the non-internal student population based on the
census block level data available. I also drop blocks located in non-residential areas such as harbors,
factories or parks because demographic estimates from those areas may be less accurate. Those
are just a handful of blocks and their elimination does not change any result. Second, to eliminate
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any concern that the results are driven by outliers or measurement error, I limit the sample to blocks
with turnout rate between 5% and 95% in all elections. Third, I run the specifications using the
original full sample including census blocks with turnout larger than one. Fourth, I include controls
for each block’s racial composition in the full model to alleviate concerns that the homeownership
effect may be caused by systematic differences in turnout across racial groups. None of the
coefficients on racial composition controls are significant, and all other results hold.
For the fixed effects model I conduct one more robustness check. The identification
assumption in the fixed effects model is that the block-level confounders are time-invariant. One
may argue that gentrification may invalidate the time-invariant assumption. Therefore, I drop
census blocks defined as been gentrified between 2000 and 2016 (about 10% of the original sample)
by the Governing website19. All point estimates remain the same.20

5. Conclusion
This paper documents the fact that homeowners are more likely to vote in U.S. mayoral
elections compared to renters living in the same community. There are two potential channels
leading to this result. First, homeowners are more financially invested in the community by way
of owning a house. Their financial stake in a community makes them more eager to participate in
local political processes to promote policies that protect the property value. Renters, on the other
hand, do not have similar stakes in a community and face fewer economic incentives to vote.

19

The Governing website classifies gentrification at Census track level. A Census tract is considered to be
gentrified if (a) the tract’s median household income and median home value fall within the bottom 40th percentile
of all tracts within a metro area in 2000; (b) the tract increases into the top third percentile for both inflation-adjusted
median home values and percentage of adults with bachelors’ degrees in 2016. Details please refer to
http://www.governing.com/gov-data.
20
I present all the robustness check tables in the appdendix of the online version of this paper. Link:
http://boqianjiang.weebly.com/uploads/1/1/2/9/112968739/boqian_voting_paper.pdf
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Second, homeownership also creates frictions on household mobility. Therefore, homeowners
receive longer utility flow from local public goods consumption. Controlling for the mobility
channel, my results suggest that the financial incentive alone is the driver of homeowners’
tendency to vote in mayoral elections. Identification in this paper is obtained by (a) using a fixed
effects model to control for unobserved confounders; (b) directly modeling the confounders using
a control function approach. Both approaches use presidential election turnout outcome as the
counterfactual. Since national-level elections and polity initiatives are less relevant to property
value and local public good provision, the difference in tendency to vote between homeowners
and renters should diminish in presidential elections.
The homevoter hypothesis literature shows home-voters and lease-voters vote differently
in local political processes due to housing price capitalization effects (Fischel, 2001; Dehring et
al., 2008; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015). The findings in this paper further beg the question of
whether uneven turnout between homeowners and renters in U.S. local elections causes biased
policies favoring homeowners (e.g., using more strict zoning laws to keep housing value
appreciation). To gain support, local political candidates may design policies to please the high
turnout group. This may result in policies that likely fail to maximize total social welfare. Kahn
(2011) provides some evidence that homeowner cities are more likely to block new housing
development based on data from California. Future work could marshal evidence as to whether
uneven turnout between homeowners and renters affects the design of local policy or policy
outcomes.
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Appendix
A.

Data Sources:

A.1. Election data:
Philadelphia election data is retrieved from Philadelphia City Commissioners website:
http://www.philadelphiavotes.com/en/resources-a-data/ballot-box-app.
Chicago election data is retrieved from Chicago Board of Election Commissioners website:
http://www.chicagoelections.com/en/election3.asp.
Seattle election data is retrieved from King County’s county website:
http://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/elections/elections/past-elections.aspx.
In Chicago, the precinct definition changed between year 2011 and 2012. To append three
rounds Chicago election data together I manually build a correspondent between old and new
Chicago precinct using GIS software. The methodology is the same as the one I use to build
correspondence between 2000 census block groups and 2010 census block groups. Detail of the
GIS work is laid out below.

A.2. Census data:
Most of the census block groups level demographic data is not available on the American Fact
Finder (https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml ). I retrieve the data from
ACS Summary file on Census server and clean them following the manual book provided by
Census. Detail about the Summary file and retrieving guidance is available at
http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/tools/summary-file-retrieval-tool.html.
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The Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP) data is a separate product by
Census. It’s available at
https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html.

B.

Census blocks correspondence file building procedure:

For each of the three cities, I use GIS software to build the correspondence between 2000 census
blocks (census block groups) and 2010 Census blocks in following steps:
(1) Obtain the 2000 and 2010 census block groups shapefiles from Census website
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-cart-boundary.html
(2) Overlap the 2000 and 2010 shapefiles together in the GIS software.
(3) For each 2000 census block groups, the GIS software calculates its overlapping with all
2010 census block groups. Then based on the calculation the GIS software will assign a number
to indicate what percentage of a 2000 census block groups belongs to a 2010 census block
groups. This generates a correspondence file for the given city.
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Table 1: Mean and dispersion measure of election turnout rate from three U.S. cities
Mayoral election turnout
Presidential election turnout
Election
N
cycle
µ
σ/µ
µ
σ/µ
1
1129
0.42
0.26
0.62
0.19
Philadelphia
2
1129
0.25
0.36
0.66
0.24
3
1129
0.16
0.43
0.60
0.26
1
1874
0.24
0.45
0.53
0.32
Chicago
2
1874
0.26
0.42
0.61
0.26
3
1874
0.33
0.33
0.55
0.32
1
377
0.40
0.35
0.66
0.27
Seattle
2
377
0.45
0.31
0.70
0.23
3
377
0.41
0.34
0.69
0.26
Note: The election turnout rates are measured at census block level. This election panel covers mayoral
and presidential elections held between 2003 and 2013 for Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle. The
elections are grouped into three election cycles and the election cycles are four years apart. Each election
cycle contains a mayoral election and a presidential election. The detail of the election grouping is
summarized in Table 2.
City
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Table 2: Election panel grouping list and merge with Census data
Election
Mayoral election
cycle
2003 Philly,
Chicago
1
2005 Seattle
2007 Philly,
Chicago
2
2009 Seattle
2011 Philly,
Chicago
3
2013 Seattle

Presidential election

Census Data

2004 All Three Cities

Average of 2000 Decennial Census and
ACS 2005-2009 5-year-estimates

2008 All Three Cities

ACS 2006-2010 5-year-estimates

2012 All Three Cities

ACS 2010-2014 5-year-estimates

Note: The election panel covers mayoral and presidential elections held between 2003 and 2013 for
Philadelphia (Philly), Chicago and Seattle. Data merge between election data and Census data is based on 2010
Census blocks definition.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for election turnout and owner–occupancy rate

City
Philadelp
hia
Chicago

Seattle

Election
cycle

N

Mayoral election
turnout

Presidential election
turnout

Owner-occupancy
rate

1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

1129
1129
1129
1874
1874
1874
377
377
377

mean / median (sdv)
0.42 / 0.43 (0.11)
0.25 / 0.25 (0.09)
0.16 / 0.16 (0.07)
0.24 / 0.23 (0.11)
0.26 / 0.34 (0.11)
0.33 / 0.31 (0.12)
0.40 / 0.41 (0.14)
0.45 / 0.46 (0.14)
0.41 / 0.43 (0.14)

mean / median (sdv)
0.62 / 0.63 (0.12)
0.66 / 0.65 (0.16)
0.60 / 0.59 (0.16)
0.53 / 0.53 (0.17)
0.61 / 0.61 (0.16)
0.55 / 0.53 (0.18)
0.66 / 0.69 (0.18)
0.70 / 0.71 (0.17)
0.69 / 0.72 (0.18)

mean / median (sdv)
0.59 / 0.61 (0.21)
0.57 / 0.58 (0.23)
0.54 / 0.55 (0.23)
0.48 / 0.45 (0.23)
0.49 / 0.47 (0.24)
0.47 / 0.44 (0.24)
0.49 / 0.50 (0.25)
0.49 / 0.50 (0.26)
0.49 / 0.50 (0.25)

Note: The unit of observation is census blocks. The election panel covers mayoral and presidential elections held
between 2003 and 2013 for Philadelphia (Philly), Chicago and Seattle. The owner-occupancy rate data is obtained
from the Census.

33

Table 4: Fixed effects model estimation results using mayoral election panel data
Dependent variable

turnout rate
(2)
(3)
***
0.158
0.078***
(0.01)
(0.01)

(4)
0.047***
(0.02)

-0.167*** -0.048**

-0.012

-0.812***

-0.127

0.023

(0.08)

(0.08)

Household median income (Million $)

(0.02)
-0.767***
(0.12)

(0.08)
-3.085***
(0.50)

% High school and some college among
pop>25

-0.088***

-0.288***

(0.02)
0.083***
(0.02)
0.020
(0.02)
0.209***
(0.02)
0.301***
(0.03)
0.10
3
–
3369
10107

(0.10)
0.403***
(0.11)
0.121*
(0.07)
0.833***
(0.10)
1.251***
(0.11)
0.09
3
–
3369
10107

Owner-occupancy rate

(1)
0.197***
(0.01)

% Moved into current residence within
past 12 month

(0.01)

(0.02)

% College above among pop>25
% Married-household
% Adults 30 to 60
% Adults 60 above
R-squared
Election cycle fixed effects
City fixed effects
Census block fixed effects
Observations

0.24
3
3
–
10107

0.26
3
3
–
10107

0.06
3
–
3369
10107

(5)
0.705***
(0.03)

0.17
3
3
–
10107

log (turnout rate)
(6)
(7)
***
0.516
0.372***
(0.04)
(0.06)

0.19
3
3
–
10107

0.05
3
–
3369
10107

(8)
0.229***
(0.07)

Note: The mayoral election panel data is from Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle between 2003 and 2013. The unit of observation is census blocks. Robust
standard errors clustered at census blocks in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Fixed effects model estimation results using presidential election panel data
Dependent variable
Owner-occupancy rate

(1)
0.096***
(0.01)

% Moved into current residence within
past 12 month

turnout rate
(2)
(3)
***
0.070
-0.016
(0.01)
(0.02)

(4)
-0.026
(0.02)

-0.108***

-0.035

(0.02)

(0.02)

Household median income (Million $)
% High school and some college among
pop>25
% College above among pop>25
% Married-household
% Adults 30 to 60
% Adults 60 above
R-squared
Election cycle fixed effects
City fixed effects
Census block fixed effects
Observations

0.10
3
3
–
10107

0.10
3
3
–
10107

0.07
3
–
3369
10107

log (turnout rate)
(6)
(7)
***
0.116
-0.010
(0.03)
(0.04)

(8)
-0.022
(0.04)

0.008

-0.251***

-0.057

0.018

(0.02)
-0.857***
(0.15)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.05)
-1.515***
(0.30)

(5)
0.175***
(0.03)

-0.025

-0.097

(0.03)
0.120***
(0.03)
-0.065***
(0.02)
0.261***
(0.03)
0.345***
(0.03)
0.11
3
–
3369
10107

(0.07)
0.162**
(0.07)
-0.122***
(0.05)
0.430***
(0.07)
0.625***
(0.07)
0.08
3
–
3369
10107

0.06
3
3
–
10107

0.07
3
3
–
10107

0.05
3
–
3369
10107

Note: The presidential election panel data is from Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle between 2003 and 2013. The unit of observation is census blocks.
Robust standard errors clustered at census blocks in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Fixed effects model results using pooled mayoral and presidential election panel data
Dependent variable
Owner-occupancy rate *
Mayoral dummy
Mayoral election dummy
Owner-occupancy rate
% Moved into current residence
within past 12 month
Household median income
(Million $)
% High school and some
college among pop>25
% College above among
pop>25
% Married-household
% Adults 30 to 60
% Adults 60 above

(1)

turnout rate
(2)

(3)

(6)

log (turnout rate)
(7)
(8)

0.078

0.078

0.073

0.446

0.446

0.250

(0.01)
-0.296
(0.00)
-0.000
(0.01)

(0.01)
-0.296
(0.00)
-0.029
(0.02)

(0.02)
-0.018
(0.03)
-0.026
(0.02)

(0.02)
-0.883
(0.01)
-0.024
(0.04)

(0.02)
-0.883
(0.01)
-0.119
(0.05)

(0.06)
-0.996
(0.10)
-0.022
(0.05)

-0.002

0.008

0.020

0.018

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.06)

(0.06)

-0.812

-0.857

-2.300

-1.515

(0.12)

(0.16)

(0.35)

(0.33)

-0.057

-0.025

-0.192

-0.097

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.07)

(0.07)

0.101

0.120

0.282

0.162

(0.02)
-0.023
(0.02)
0.235
(0.02)
0.323
(0.03)
0.71
3
3369

(0.03)
-0.065
(0.02)
0.261
(0.03)
0.345
(0.04)
0.77
3
3369

(0.08)
-0.000
(0.05)
0.631
(0.07)
0.938
(0.08)
0.63
3
3369

(0.08)
-0.122
(0.05)
0.430
(0.08)
0.625
(0.07)
0.71
3
3369

R-squared
0.70
0.62
Election cycle fixed effects
3
3
Census block fixed effects
3369
3369
Mayoral dummy interaction
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
with election cycle fixed effects
Mayoral dummy interaction
–
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
with other slope variables
Mayoral dummy interaction
–
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
with block fixed effect
Observations
20214
20214
20214
20214
20214
20214
Note: The election panel data is from Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle between 2003 and 2013. The unit
of observation is census blocks. Robust standard errors clustered at census blocks in parenthesis. ***
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 7: OLS estimation result comparison across different fixed effects models
Dependent variable
(1)

(2)

turnout rate
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

log (turnout rate)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)

Panel A: Mayoral Election
Owner-occupancy rate
R-squared

0.093*** 0.091*** 0.117*** 0.060*** 0.047***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.22
0.25
0.33
0.51
0.10

0.219*** 0.209*** 0.356*** 0.244*** 0.229***
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.07)
0.18
0.20
0.26
0.53
0.09

Panel B: Presidential Election
0.151*** 0.145*** 0.123*** 0.082***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.45
R-squared
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Other slope variables
–
Election cycle fixed effects
3
3
3
City fixed effects
–
–
3
–
1177
Census track fixed effects
–
–
–
–
–
Census block fixed effects
–
–
Observations
10107
10107
10107
10107
Owner-occupancy rate

-0.026
(0.02)
0.11
Yes
3
–
–
3369
10107

0.284*** 0.271*** 0.213*** 0.172***
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.50
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
3
3
3
3
–
–
–
1177
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
10107
10107
10107
10107

-0.022
(0.04)
0.08
Yes
3
–
–
3369
10107

Note: The election panel data is from Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle between 2003 and 2013. The unit of observation is census blocks. Panel A uses election
panel data from mayoral elections. Panel B uses election panel data from presidential elections. Robust standard errors clustered at census blocks in parenthesis.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 8: Control function estimation results using election panel data
Dependent variable
Owner-occupancy rate
% Moved into current residence within past 12 month
Presidential election turnout

Mayoral election turnout
(1)
(2)
(3)
***
***
0.151
0.120
0.051***
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
***
***
-0.161
-0.112
0.044***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
***
0.453
0.450***
(0.12)
(0.16)

log (Mayoral election turnout)
(6)
(7)
(8)
***
***
0.490
0.391
0.131***
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.03)
***
***
-0.787
-0.563
-0.197***
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.04)

Log (Presidential election turnout)
R-squared
City by election cycle fixed effects
Other slope controls
Observations

0.49
9
No
10107

0.76
9
No
10107

0.79
9
No
10107

0.39
9
No
10107

0.890***
(0.06)
0.75
9
No
10107

0.882***
(0.07)
0.78
9
No
10107

Note: The election panel data is from Philadelphia, Chicago and Seattle between 2003 and 2013. The unit of observation is census blocks. Robust standard
errors clustered at census blocks in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Abstract
We develop a new method to identify and control for selection when estimating the productivity
effects of city size. For single peaked factor return distributions, selecting out low-performing
agents has no effect on modal productivity but reduces the CDF evaluated at the mode.
Spillovers from agglomeration have the reverse effect. This holds regardless of whether selection
arises from the decision to participate or location choice. Estimates based on law firm
productivity, wages for married women and wages for full-time men all confirm that selection
contributes to urban productivity and that doubling city size causes productivity to increase by 12.5 percent.

JEL Codes:

R00 (General Urban, Rural, and Real Estate Economics)
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1. Introduction
A challenge for all studies that seek to estimate the productivity effects of agglomeration
and city size is the need to separate out selection from spillover effects (see Rosenthal and
Strange (2004) and Combes and Gobillon (2015) for reviews). This arises because cities are
expensive places in which to live, work and operate a business (e.g. Rosenthal and Strange
(2012), Combes et al. (2012), Black et al (2014)) so that only the most productive workers and
companies participate – a threshold effect. It also arises because cities may attract unusually
talented individuals who thrive on the intensity of urban life – a migration effect (e.g. Glaeser
and Mare (2001), Rosenthal and Strange (2008), Combes et al. (2008), de La Roca (2017)). Both
forms of selection contribute to higher levels of productivity in cities, confounding efforts to
identify the causal impact of agglomeration on individual productivity.1 Building off recent
work by Combes et al. (2012), this paper develops a new method that identifies the presence and
nature of selection while yielding estimates of the causal effect of city size on productivity.
Combes et al. (2012) argue that the presence or absence of selection effects can be
identified by examining the shape of the observed factor return distribution. They note that if
companies drop out when factor productivity is below a common threshold, selection lefttruncates the observed distribution of returns. Assuming further that productivity thresholds
increase with city size, they examine whether truncation is more prevalent among larger cities,
using data on manufacturing plants in France. They fail to find evidence of such patterns and
conclude from this that higher manufacturing productivity in larger French cities arises primarily
from spillover effects and not from selection.

1

Common approaches to deal with the endogenous selection of workers and companies into different sized cities
include the use of pseudo-random experiments (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al (2015)) and instrumental variables (e.g. Rosenthal
and Strange (2008)). Nevertheless, the confounding effects of selection remain challenging and pseudo-experiments
and instrumental variable approaches often offer solutions that do not extend beyond the immediate study.
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This paper extends the Combes et al. (2012) model in ways that yield a more general
approach to controlling for selection effects. Our model applies to settings in which the latent
factor return distribution is single peaked with a well-defined mode. This is characteristic of
wage and earnings patterns, for example, where it is common to model the underlying
distribution of returns as log normal. In such instances, if selection disproportionately culls out
lower performing units to the left of the mode, then the CDF evaluated at the mode will be
reduced. For sufficiently single-peaked factor return distributions, however, the modal level of
productivity is highly robust to selection whereas selecting out lower performing agents pushes
up the observed mean return.2 Implementing these ideas points to two complementary
regressions. The first regresses the CDF of the modal factor return on log city size while the
second regresses log modal factor return on log city size. Evidence of a negative city size effect
in the first regression indicates that selection occurs disproportionately to the left of the mode. In
such instances, the second regression should also yield an estimate of the return to city size that
is below that of the mean return. Moreover, with sufficiently precise estimates of the mode (in a
sense to be clarified later), the second regression yields estimates of the return to city size that
are robust to selection effects.
The model above can be used to evaluate the presence, nature and impact of selection
both when selection arises from threshold effects and when selection arises from migration
(sorting). However, the two sources of selection entail different modeling assumptions that in
some instances affect interpretation and robustness. In the threshold model, we focus on the

2

Selecting out low-performing agents will also push up the median return. However, throughout the paper we
emphasize comparisons between modal and mean values rather than the median. Partly this is because the first
regression described below does not extend to median values since, by definition, the CDF evaluated at the median
is always 50 percent, and also because the vast majority of studies in the agglomeration literature have focused on
mean returns to city size.
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decision to participate, as when a firm survives and remains in business or when an individual
chooses to work, while treating location choice as exogenous. In the migration model, we focus
on city choice and the possibility that talented individuals may sort into larger cities; in this
model we treat the decision to participate as exogenous. Both sources of selection yield the same
qualitative predictions as described above. However, the threshold model is a closed city model
in which selection contributes to higher productivity in larger metropolitan areas because of
rising operating costs or other mechanisms (e.g. competition as in Combes et al (2012)) that push
up the productivity threshold. The migration model, in contrast, is an open city framework. In
this model, sorting of skilled individuals into larger cities equivalently implies that lower-skilled
individuals disproportionately sort into smaller cities. Nevertheless, while the interpretation
associated with the two forms of selection (threshold versus migration) is different, the
anticipated patterns from the two-part regression framework above are the same provided the
factor return distribution is sufficiently single-peaked.3
Relative to our approach, it is worth noting that Combes et al (2012) treat selection as
arising from a common threshold that increases with city size. Our threshold model, in contrast,
allows for heterogeneity of threshold levels across individuals and establishments within a given
city, effectively treating the threshold as a random variable. The presence of such heterogeneity
will make it more difficult to discern evidence of truncation in the factor return distribution. Our
approach based on the CDF of the mode provides a simple but revealing way to identify the
presence and nature of selection that allows for within-city heterogeneity. Moreover, in the
special case where all threshold-based selection is to the left of the mode – even allowing for

3

We show later in the paper that the first regression patterns based on the CDF evaluated at the mode are especially
robust to the source of selection (threshold versus migration). The second regression based on modal return is also
robust provided the tendency for individuals to migrate into larger cities increases monotonically with skill but not at
too high a rate relative to the degree to which the factor return distribution is single-peaked.
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within-city threshold heterogeneity – the rate at which the CDF at the mode declines with city
size is an exact measure of the extent of selection. In the more general case where selection
occurs throughout the factor return distribution, a decline in the CDF at the mode indicates that
selection occurs disproportionately below the mode and the rate at which that increases with city
size provides a lower bound estimate of the extent of selection. In each of these cases, the modal
value of productivity or wage will be highly robust to selection effects provided the factor return
distribution is sufficiently single-peaked.
For the migration model, we show later in the paper that interpretation of our first
regression depends on two key modeling assumptions. The first as above is that the latent
aggregate factor return distribution is single-peaked with a well-defined mode. The second is that
the tendency for individuals to select into larger cities increases monotonically with skill.
Provided these conditions are met, migration of skilled individuals into larger cities causes the
CDF evaluated at the modal factor return to decrease with city size. Moreover, and again as
above, provided the return distribution is sufficiently single-peaked relative to the rate at which
skilled individuals select into larger cities, modal productivity will be robust to selection in
contrast to the mean.
This paper is the first we are aware of to use modal productivity when measuring the
return to city size. The vast literature on agglomeration economies has instead focused almost
exclusively on mean returns (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Combes and Gobillon (2015)
for reviews). Whether our estimates based on the modal return are impactful depends in part on
the degree to which the mode is of intrinsic interest for the outcome measure being considered.
In instances where factor return distributions are symmetric and single-peaked, this is
straightforward as the mode, mean and median are all alike. Where factor return distributions are
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single-peaked but skewed, the mode is also often as informative a summary measure of the
central tendency of the return distribution as the median and mean, but for all three measures
context matters. On the other hand, using the mode to identify the presence and nature of
selection is robust to any context for which the single peak condition is plausible.4
We use three data sets to illustrate our approach and to provide new estimates of the
nature of selection and return to city size. To highlight threshold effects, we use law firm
productivity for all law firms across the United States, drawing on establishment level data from
Dun and Bradstreet. A key modeling assumption for this example is that entry and exist costs for
law firms are low but annual operating costs are high. Moreover, we assume that lawyers
initially have imperfect knowledge of their own ability and discover through experience whether
they can profitably run their own law firm or are better off working for an established company.
Law firms that are not sufficiently productive eventually close as annual loses persist. As
formalized later in the paper, under these conditions, threshold effects should be more
pronounced among older law firms since only the most productive companies survive. Assuming
further that operating costs are higher in larger cities, we expect this pattern to increase with city
size. These sharp priors provide an opportunity to check whether the first regression based on
CDF evaluated at the mode is successful at identifying the presence and nature of selection.

4

Our emphasis on using the mode as a measure of the central tendency of a distribution in the presence of selection
effects has antecedents in earlier work by Lee (1989). Lee showed that under certain conditions, the mode from a
truncated distribution is a consistent estimate of the conditional mean from the original, non-truncated distribution.
As with Combes et al (2012), Lee (1989) focused on the case where the point of truncation is known and common
across agents. Our work is also broadly related to the modal regression literature in statistics that construct statistical
models by exploiting different properties of the mode (Huang et al. 2013; Yao and Li, 2014; Chen et al., 2016). That
literature, however, does not consider the robust nature of the mode in the presence of selection. In economics, focus
of modal values is rare. Cardoso and Portugal (2005) show that modal wage is a better measure of the central
tendency of the underlying wage distribution when there is collective bargaining. Bound and Krueger (1991) and Hu
and Schennach (2008) discuss how to use mode to account for certain forms of reporting errors when measuring the
distribution income. Our approach is also related to the “identification at infinity” models in Chamberlain (1986),
Lewbel (2007), and D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel (2013). These models assume that selection effects shrink to zero as
certain key control variables approach “infinity”. In these models, however, selection is based on one or more
control variables whereas selection in our paper is based on the dependent (outcome) variable.
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We also test our model using individual wage rates for married full-time working white
women, drawing on data from the 5 percent file of the 2000 U.S. census (obtained from IPUMS).
It is well-established that married female labor supply is highly elastic so the decision to work
full time is relevant to threshold effects (e.g. Heim (2007); Blau and Kahn (2007)).

5

Contributing to this view, Black et al. (2014) argue that higher commuting costs in large cities
discourage married women from working. Married female labor supply decisions may also affect
choice of metropolitan area as in Costa and Kahn (2000).

For these reasons, wage patterns for

married women are likely to be driven by a combination of threshold and migration effects.

In

the analysis to follow, our models based on female wage rates are estimated stratifying women
into skilled (college degree or more) and low-skilled (high school degree or less) individuals.
That is because labor supply elasticity likely differs for high- and low-skilled married women
and for that reason selection effects associated with city size may differ as well, although the
direction of any such differences is less clear. In this context, our model has potential to reveal
whether selection effects related to city size are more pronounced for skilled versus low-skilled
married women.
To illustrate migration effects, we focus on prime age, 25 to 54 year old, full-time white
male workers in the U.S. Consistent with extensive work in the labor literature, for this sample,
we treat the decision to work as inelastic and exogenous (e.g. Heim (2007); Blau and Kahn
(2007)). Under the assumption that labor supply is exogenous, selection effects for this group are
likely driven disproportionately by migration and location decisions. Data for this exercise were
also taken from the 2000 Census.

5

Based on 1999-2001 CPS data, Blau and Kahn (2007) find that the elasticity of annual working hours with respect
to own log wage is 0.357 for the married women and 0.046 for the married men. Moreover, the elasticity of annual
working hours with respect to spouse’s log wage is -0.192 for the married women and -0.006 for the married men.
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For all three exercises, estimates based on the CDF evaluated at the mode yield robust
and compelling evidence that selection contributes to productivity in larger cities. For law firms,
the modal return from doubling city size is approximately 1 percent as compared to 1.7 percent
at the mean. For this application, however, we also find that the estimated return to city size at
the mode is sensitive to the bandwidth with which the mode is measured. As discussed more
fully later in the paper, this highlights a power issue and limitation of our approach: in addition
to requiring that the underlying latent distribution be single-peaked, sample size must be large
enough to yield a sufficiently precise estimate of the mode. For the wage applications, the
observed distributions are especially single-peaked and the sample sizes are large. In these
applications, for both married women and prime age men, the sample modes are robust to
reasonable alternative choice of bandwidth as are the estimated returns to city size at the modal
values. For skilled women, doubling city size increases modal wage by 2.3 percent compared to
4.3 percent at the mean; for low-skilled women, selection effects are largely absent and doubling
city size increases wage by roughly 3 percent at both the mode and the mean. For men, doubling
city size increases the modal wage by roughly 2.5 percent compared to 4.5 percent at the mean.
As with married women, evidence of selection effects is largely absent for low-skilled men.
We proceed as follows. The next section outlines our selection model, first for
heterogeneous threshold effects and then for migration. Section 3 describes the data and present
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses how to measure the mode. Sections 5 presents the results
and Section 6 concludes.
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2. Model
This section presents our modeling framework. We begin with the influence of
agglomeration economies on the distribution of worker productivity in large versus small cities
in the absence of selection effects. The model is then extended to allow for threshold-based
selection and selection arising from migration.

2.1. Productivity spillovers from city size
Suppose initially that there are no selection effects that influence the distribution of
productivity in large versus small cities. Instead, the only force that causes productivity
distributions to differ across metropolitan areas are spillovers arising from city size. To simplify,
we assume two different size cities, denoted as 0 for small cities and 1 for large cities.
Productivity spillovers from agglomeration increase productivity in larger cities.
Let individual worker productivity be denoted by y, and let f0(y) and f1(y) represent the
distribution of productivity among individuals in small and large cities, respectively. Cities are
assumed to be large enough that f0(y) and f1(y) are approximately continuous on y, and worker
productivity in a size-0 city depends only on a worker’s intrinsic level of skill. If agglomeration
economies increase productivity by a common factor for all workers, f1(y) shifts to the right
relative to f0(y). If instead, the returns to city size increase with skill, possibly because more
talented workers are better able to take advantage of large city opportunities, then this would
create a “dilation effect” (Combes et al., 2012) causing f1(y) to become right skewed with an
elongated right tail. Allowing for both effects, for a given individual, productivity in a larger city
is given by,
y1 = β0 + β1y0

(2.1)
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In expression (2.1), β0 measures the common productivity boost for all workers in a
larger city while β1 > 1 would imply that the returns to city size increase with worker skill. As in
Combes et. al (2012), expression (2.1) specifies spillover effects in a linear form for which shift
and dilation effects preserve an individual’s productivity rank within a given city. Under these
conditions, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for productivity up to a given skill level,
y0, is the same in each city, F0 and F1,
!" ($" ) = !' ($' ($" ))

(2.2)

Substituting for y1 from expression (2.1) and taking derivatives, the relationship between large
and small city productivity densities is given by,
'
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Our most important modeling assumption in the empirical work to follow, referred to as
Assumption 1, is given by:

Assumption 1: f0(y) is single peaked with a well defined mode at an interior location.

In conjunction with spillover effects as modeled in (2.3), this assumption has important
implications for the shape of productivity density functions in large versus small cities. To
illustrate, we took 10,000 random draws of log(y0) from a normal distribution (with standard
deviation of 0.4), mirroring assumptions in the labor and agglomeration literatures that typically
treat wage and earnings distributions as log-normal.

For illustrative purposes, we also set β0 =

0.5 and β1 = 1.3. Figure 1 then traces out the resulting productivity density functions for large
cities (the dashed red line) and small cities (the solid black line).
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Notice that for large cities, the density function is right shifted with an elongated right tail
(right skewed) relative to the density function for small cities. The large city density is also
flatter, with a lower density for any given level of productivity, and a right shifted mode. A
positive value for β0 shifts the large city distribution along the x-axis by β0 units while preserving
its shape. This is apparent from (2.1) and (2.3). In (2.1), the derivative of y1 with respect to β0 is
1 while from (2.3) the large city density with β1 = 1 is f0(y - β0). Observe, however, that the mode
in Figure 1 shifts from 0.85 in small cities to 1.55 in large cities even though β0 is just 0.5. The
additional rightward shift in the mode is a consequence of the dilation effect arising from β1 > 1
which draws the mode further to the right, although not immediately apparent from a casual
viewing of (2.3). As is evident in the figure, the mode in the large city density is also not as
pronounced relative to a smaller city. This also arises from β1 > 1, which flattens the density
function by shifting mass from the center of the distribution into the increasingly elongated right
tail, and bearing in mind that the density function must always integrate to 1.

2.2. Threshold effects
Consider now the influence of threshold effects that contribute to selection and which
differ across agents within a given city. We assume that the latent productivity distributions are
identical in small and large cities but threshold effects are more pronounced in larger
metropolitan areas. For simplicity, small city residents are described below as participating in the
labor market with probabiltiy 1 regardless of skill, or π0(y) = 1, where π0(y) is the probability of
participating. If in the large city π1(y) is also constant with π1(y) = p < 1, then the selection
process is random and f1(y) = f0(y). More relevant for our context, however, is the possibility that
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in large cities participation increases with skill, which we formalize as our second core modeling
assumption:
Assumption 2: In large cities, the probability of participating in the labor market
increases monotonically with skill, ∂π1(y)/∂y > 0.

Assumption 2 captures the tendency for operating costs tend to be higher in larger cities
and/or the environment more competitive (as in Combes et al (2012)). For that reason, weaker
companies are more likely to drop out in larger cities relative to the experience in smaller
metropolitan areas. Anlaogously, because commuting costs tend to be higher in larger cities,
Assumption 2 captures the sense that lower productivity workers are more likely to drop out of
the labor force in larger cities relative to smaller metropolitan areas (see Black et al (2014) for
related discussion).
Allowing for heterogeneous threshold effects as above, expression (2.3) becomes,
(' ($) =
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where 2 = ∫ 4' (5)(" (5)65. In (2.4), note that π1(y) < 1 reduces the density for a given level of
y in the larger city, while c scales the density up by the inverse share of agents that participate
(firms or individuals), ensuring that the density function integrates to 1.
We illustrate the qualitative effects of threshold-based selection in Figures 2 and 3 using
the same simulated data as for Figure 1, first without and then with spillovers. In Figure 2, we set
β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, consistent with the absence of agglomeration economies. The π1(y) function is
specified such that π1(y) increases up to a value of 1 at the mode of the latent distribution (at y =
0.85) and remains at 1 thereafter.6 Imposing these features, ten percent of the simulated work

6

More precisely, we set π(y) = - 0.27 + 1.5y for y ≤ 0.85 and π(y) = 1 for y ≥ 0.85. Specified in this manner,
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force is selected out of the large city labor market, all of whom have skill levels to the left of the
mode. The important point to recognize in Figure 2 is that even though all selection occurs to the
left of the mode, selection steepens the slope of the large city density function on both sides of
the mode while also increasing the height of the mode. Together, these effects cause the modal
level of productivity in the density function to become more pronounced.
Figure 3 illustrates the combined influence of threshold and spillover effects. In this
instance we set β0 and β1 to the values used in Figure 1 and specify π1(y) as in Figure 2. In Panel
A, notice that the influence of threshold effects is difficult to discern relative to the pattern in
Figure 2. That is because dilation associated with β1 > 1 flattens and right-skews the distribution
causing the mode to become less pronounced. This offsets the tendency for threshold effects to
accentuate the mode. On the other hand, because in this example all selection is to the left of the
mode in the large city population, the CDF evaluated at the mode must be reduced relative to the
CDF at the mode in the small city distribution. This is readily apparent in Panel B which shows
that the corresponding CDFs evaluated at the respective small and large city modes are 0.34 and
0.27.
The patterns in Figures 2 and 3 are based on an extreme selection process for which all
selection is to the left of the mode. Nevertheless, the patterns highlight two principles that apply
in the more general settings in which selection occurs throughout the productivity distribution.

Proposition 1: Given Assumptions 1 and 2, if selection occurs disproportionately to the
left of the mode in the large city distribution, then the CDF evaluated at the mode
declines with city size while the reverse is true if selection occurs disproportionately to
the right of the mode.

π1(y) = 0 for the lowest level of y in the simulated sample and approaches 1 asymptotically from below at y = 0.85.
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This proposition motivates our first regression described in the Introduction and points to a
simple, robust way to identify whether selection occurs more to the left or right of the mode of a
latent productivity distribution. Moreover, in the special case where selection occurs only to the
left (or right) of the mode, the difference in CDF evaluated at the mode for large versus small
cities is an exact measure of the extent of selection.
The second principle implicit in Figures 2 and 3 is that if (i) the latent distribution is
sufficiently single peaked with a well defined mode and (ii) the selection process that governs
the manner in which π1(y) changes with y is not too extreme in nature, threshold-based selection
will not affect the value of the mode in the observed productivity distribution. This points to our
second proposition and related regression.

Proposition 2: Provided that the mode in the underlying latent single-peaked distribution
is sufficiently well defined and the selection process is not too extreme in nature, selection will
have a small effect on the modal value in the observed productivity distribution. Under these
conditions, the observed difference in modal values between large and small cities
approximately measures the productivity spillover effect from city size.

In considering this proposition, it is important to emphasize that extreme forms of selection
would shift the mode in an observed productivity distribution. If, for example, π1(y) = 0 for y <
y*, where y* is above the mode of the latent distribution, then selection would increase the mode
in larger cities. If instead, however, π1(y) increases gradually and monotonically with y, it is
straightforward from Figure 2 to show that selection would not affect the mode provided the
latent distribution is sufficiently single peaked.
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A third principle implicit in Figures 2 and 3 is that provided π1(y) increases
monotonically with y, selection will typically have less impact on the mode of the observed
distribution than the mean or median. This brings us to our third proposition.

Proposition 3: If the underlying latent distribution is sufficiently single-peaked with a
well defined mode (in a manner to be clarified), and if π1(y) increases monotonically with
y, selection will typically have less impact on the mode of the observed distribution than
the mean or median.

There are many contexts in which one would expect π1(y) to increase monotonically with y and
for which the underlying latent distribution would be expected to be single-peaked. In such
instances, Proposition 3 emphasizes that the mode is typically less sensitive to selection and
yields a more robust measure of the underlying relationship than the mean or median.

2.3. Migration effects
Consider next the influence of migration as the source of selection effects. In this
instance, we assume a common aggregate single-peaked (latent) productivity distribution from
which individual workers sort into two types of cities, small (size 0) and large (size 1). In this
setting, π(y) represents the probability that a worker with skill level y chooses to locate in the
larger city. As with the threshold model, if π(y) equals a constant p, the selection process is
random and f1(y) = f0(y). In this instance, selection would not affect the CDF evaluated at the
modes in small and large cities. A more realistic scenario, however, is that π(y) increases in a
smooth, monotonic fashion with y, analogous to Assumption 2 above, and consistent with the
view that higher skilled individuals are more likely to select into larger cities. This would also
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simultaneously reduce skill levels in smaller urban areas. Nevertheless, all three propositions
outlined above still hold.
To clarify, consider first an extreme but illustrative selection process. We set π(y) = 0 for
y ≤ y* and π(y) = 1 for y > y*, where y* is an interior point in the aggregate distribution.
Specified in this manner, all workers below y* sort into the small city while all of those above y*
sort into the large city. Figures 4a and 4b highlight implications of these conditions using the
same simulated data as above. The key difference between the figures is whether y* is below or
above the modal level of skill in the aggregate distribution, denoted by ym and equal to 0.85 as
before.
In Figure 4a we set y* equal to 0.65 so that y* < ym. This causes the small city density
function (in the top portion of Panel A) to increase monotonically with y with a mode equal to y*
= 0.65. The large city density, in contrast (in the top portion of Panel B), declines monotonically
from a modal value equal to ym = 0.85. In the lower portions of each panel, notice also that the
CDF evaluated at the mode in the small city equals 1 since all workers have productivity below
y*, while the CDF for the large city must be less than 1 since the mode is at an interior location.
In Figure 4b we instead set y* equal to 1.0 so that y* > ym. This causes the small city mode to
equal ym while the large city mode becomes y*. Under these conditions, the CDF evaluated at the
large city mode collapses to 0 and the corresponding CDF for the small city is positive but less
than 1. The important point to emphasize from these patterns is that regardless of whether y* is
above or below ym, the CDF evaluated at the mode declines with city size. Provided our core
modeling assumptions 1 and 2 hold, therefore, Proposition 1 is robust to threshold and migration
effects as alternate sources of selection.
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Consider now a more realistic characterization of migration for which π(y) increases with
y in a smooth, gentle and monotonic fashion. To illustrate the influence of such a process, in
Figures 5 and 6 we again display large and small city productivity density functions using the
same simulated data as before. In both figures, we also specify π(y) so that the likelihood of
locating in a large city increases linearly with y at rate 0.1y and with π(y) set equal to 0.5 for the
least skilled individual in the sample. This also ensures that π(y) = 1 for the most skilled
individual in the sample.7 In Figure 5a, spillover effects are set to zero with β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 in
expression (2.4), while in Figure 5b we allow for spillover effects using the same specification as
for Figure 1.
Focusing first on Figure 5a, it is evident that the specified migration process has little
effect on modal productivity values, similar to the pattern in Figure 2 for threshold effects.
Migration does, however, have noteworthy effects in Figure 5a. Relative to large cities,
migration increases the height of the density function evaluated at the small city mode and
steepens the slope of the density function on either side of the small city mode. This is opposite
from the influence of threshold effects in Figure 2, and reinforces the principle that the height of
the density function evaluated at the mode and the slopes of the density function on either side of
the mode are not necessarily reliable indicators of selection effects even when the core modeling
assumptions 1 and 2 hold. This conclusion is made even stronger when the influence of
productivity spillovers is taken into account. In the upper panel of Figure 5b, dilation arising
from β1 > 1 again flattens and right-skews the productivity density function in large cities
relative to small cities, further masking the influence of migration (as in Figure 3). In the lower
panel of Figure 5b, however, which plots the CDFs for the small and large city productivity

7

Specified in this manner, 60 percent of workers in the simulated sample sort into the large city.
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distributions, the respective CDFs evaluated at the modes are 0.38 and 0.31. Once again, the
CDF evaluated at the mode declines with city size, consistent with Proposition 1.
Returning to the upper panel of Figure 5b, observe also that the modal productivity
values for small and large cities are 0.85 and 1.55, respectively. Because the underlying latent
distribution is single peaked and the selection process is not too extreme, the difference in modal
productivity between large and small cities is largely unaffected by selection and reflects
primarily the effect of city size on productivity. This reinforces Proposition 2. More generally,
because migration shifts mass to the right in the large city productivity density function relative
to the small city, that will tend to increase the spread between large and small city means (and
medians). This once again suggests that the mode is less sensitive to selection relative to the
mean and median of the underlying productivity density functions.

2.4. How sensitive is the mode to selection?
The results above require that the underlying aggregate (latent) density function for the
outcome measure is sufficiently single peaked, and that the selection process is not too extreme.
This section formalizes when these conditions are met.
Suppose that selection effects are present but agglomeration economies are not. Then β0 =
0, β1 = 1, and the conditional density in (2.4) becomes,
(' ($) =

0* (,)
1

(" ($) .

(2.5)

The question we seek to answer is by how much selection may shift the mode of the conditional
density f1(y) relative to the unconditional density f0(y). Since f (y) is assumed to be twice
differentiable and single peaked, its slope at the mode is zero. Differentiating (2.5) with respect

57

to y and setting the derivative to zero, the modal value for y (denoted by ym) in the conditional
density f1(y) must satisfy,
07(,)
0(,)

9 7(,)

= − 9. (,)

(2.6)

.

Expression (2.6) indicates that at the mode, a small change in y yields equal magnitude but
opposite signed percentage changes in the selection probability and the density of y. Multiplying
both sides of (2.6) by y this can be expressed as an elasticity condition,
:0,, = − :9. ,,
where :0,, ≈
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and :9. ,, ≈

%∆9.(,) 8
.
%∆,

Expression (2.7) says that at the modal value of the

conditional density function, the elasticity of the selection probabilty is equal to minus the
elasticity of the latent density. If the selection probability increases (or decreases) monotonically
with y, along with the asumed shape of the latent distribution, expression (2.7) will be satisfied at
a single value for y, ensuring that the conditional density is also single peaked. This is assured
because both the density and selection functions are assumed to be log concave.9
Figure 6 illustrates these principles. The upper panel displays a twice differentiable single
peaked density function and a linear monotonically increasing selection function with a vertical
intercept at the origin. The lower panel plots the corresponding values for − :9.,, and :0,, . In
the case where y is normally distributed, it is straightforward to show that − :9. ,, = $($ −
$@ )/B C with a slope of (2y –µ)/σ2 that increases at a rate of 2/ σ2. In this instance, − :9.,,

8

The elasticities above express the percent change along the vertical axis in response to a percent change along the
horizontal axis. This is the inverse of familiar demand and supply elasticities. Nevertheless, the elasticities in (2.6)
are specified as above because y is the exogenous determinant of f and π.
9
This result follows from arguments in Saumard and Wellner (2014) and An (1996). We assume that f0(y) and
4($) are both log-concave functions with f1(y) as their product scaled by a normalizing constant, c. From
Proposition 3.2 in Saumard and Wellner (2014), the product of two log-concave functions is log-concave so that
f1(y) is also log-concave. Note also that Proposition 2 in An (1996) indicates that a random variable y is distributed
in a log-concave fashion if and only if its density function is strongly unimodal. Together, these principles imply
that f1(y) is unimodal and there is a unique value for y (in its feasible range) for which (2.7) holds.
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initially declines from zero at the origin to a minimum at y = ym/2, and increases monotonically
thereafter, taking on a value of 0 at the mode and positive values thereafter. As drawn in the
upper panel, the selection function has a constant unit elasticity up to the point where π(y) = 1,
after which :0,, = 0 . The elasticity plots in the lower panel must therefore intersect to the right
of ym, indicating that selection shifts the mode of the conditional density function to the right. If
instead, the selection function was flat, then :0,, = 0 for all y and the elasticity plots intersect at
ym. In this instance, selection is random and does not affect the mode. Alternatively, if selection
declines monotonically with y, expression (2.6) still holds but the mode in the conditional density
function will shift to the left.
Two final comments remain when considering the viability of using the mode to test and
control for selection effects. First, sample size must be large enough to yield sufficiently reliable
estimates of the mode for purposes of evaluating the CDF at the mode and the impact of city size
on modal productivity. This point is considered further in the empirical sections to follow.
Second, the mode needs to be of intrinsic interest for the problem being considered. While these
conditions will not always hold, they are met in many problems regularly considered in
economics.

3. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1. Three datasets
This section describes the three datasets used to estimate the model above. In the first
instance, we use old and newly established law firms to look for evidence of selection effects and
to estimate the return to city size. As described in the Introduction, entry and exit costs are low
for lawyers operating their own firms. Suppose also that lawyers only learn whether they can
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profitably operate their own firm from experience, and the returns from running a law firm are
high if the venture is successful. Under these conditions, a wide range of lawyers may attempt to
establish their own companies, including many who are less adept but do not realize their firms
are likely to fail. This would reduce tendencies for threshold-based selection at the point of entry.
After a few years, however, lawyers discover their type and weaker companies drop out so that
threshold effects should be especially apparent among older companies. Moreover, with higher
operating costs and a more competitive environment in larger cities, evidence of thresholdrelated selection and related differences between new and older law firms should increase with
city size.
As also described in the Introduction, for full-time working married white women, it is
plausible that both threshold and migration effects contribute to selection and higher observed
wages in larger cities. Threshold effects, for example, could arise if longer commute times in
larger cities discourage women from working (e.g. Black et al (2014), while migration effects
could be associated with job market co-location challenges that draw skilled couples to larger
cities (e.g. Costa and Kahn (2000)). In contrast, for full-time working white men, labor supply is
highly inelastic. For this group, migration effects seem likely to be the dominant source of
selection. The data used for each of these applications is described below.

3.2. Law firm establishment data from Dun & Bradstreet
We collect establishment-level data for all law firms in the United States (excluding
Alaska and Hawaii) from the Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Database. The data provides
information on establishment location, level of employment, sales, industry (SIC 8-digit code),
year established, and other information. Compared to the Census data, an advantage of Dun &
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Bradstreet database is that it provides a comprehensive coverage of small businesses including
those with just one or two-workers.10
The data were collected in December 2016 and provide a snapshot of all law firms
operating in the U.S. at that time. We use establishment-level sales per worker as a proxy for
productivity. Based on the sales per worker measure, we trim the top and bottom 0.1% of the
data to drop outliers.11 Certain types of law offices may be more prevalent in large cities (e.g.
corporate law). Because of concerns about selection stem from unobserved factors embedded in
the error term, we pre-cleaned the data to difference out the average return for the primary
classifications of law firms identified in the data.12 This was done by regressing individual
establishment sale per worker on dummy variables for each type of 8-digit law office recorded in
by Dun and Bradstreet. We then added back to the residual the average sale per worker for
general law offices/attorneys which account for 90% of the sample.
MSA size is measured using population estimates from the 2015 American Community
Survey.13 A key part of our empirical strategy is to measure the mode of the sales per worker
distribution in each MSA. To make sure there are sufficient numbers of law firms present, we
retain only MSAs for which all of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) more than 30 law
firms age five or younger are present, (ii) more than 30 law firms over five years in age are
present, and (iii) MSA total population is over 100,000. After cleaning the data as above, we are

10

In our sample, there are 545,873 law establishments. Of these, 8.5% have one worker, 62.8% have two
employees, 15.0% have three workers, and 13.5% have four or more workers. In comparison, in the 2012 Economic
Census, there are 186,831 law establishments in the U.S. The main reason for the difference is that Census indicates
that it does not “survey very small businesses”. For details see the Census website:
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census/about/faq.html.
11
Similar trimming procedure is also used in Combes et al. (2008), Combes et al. (2012) and Gaubert
(forthcoming).
12
Based on SIC 8-digit codes, approximately 90% of the sample is coded as general law offices/attorneys. The
remaining 10% of the sample is coded into more specialized classifications, including corporate law, family law, etc.
13
Throughout the paper, the 2013 Office of Management and Budget metropolitan area delineations are used to
define MSAs.
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left with 239 MSAs. The total count of law firms in the sample is 545,873 firms. Of these,
74,079 firms are young, defined as five years or less in age, and 471,794 firms are old, defined as
over five years in age.14
Table 1 Panel A presents summary statistics of sales per worker for all law firms sample
and separately by age group (young and old) as well. Based on the 25th and 75th quantile, the
majority of the sales per worker measures fall within the range of $60,000 and $85,000.
Measured at the mean and different quantiles, old firms have higher sales per worker than the
young firms, indicating that older law firms are more productive than younger companies.
Figure 7a provides kernel density plots of sales per worker for the all firms sample as
well as for the different age groups. In each panel, the sales per worker distribution is singled
peaked.15 In Figure 7b, kernel density plots are provided again, stratifying each sample into
small (population < 1m) and large (population > 2.5m) MSAs. The plots make clear that the
distribution of sales per work in large cities is right-shifted as compared to small cities for in all
three samples.

3.3. Married white female full-time workers in the 2000 Census
The sample of married female non-Hispanic white full-time workers (age 25-54) was
obtained from the 2000 decennial census 5% public use micro sample (PUMS) from IPUMS

14

Among the 545,873 establishments, age related information was missing in the D&B data for 67,358
establishments (12% of the sample). For roughly 200 of these firms, we searched the companies on the web by
establishment name (which is also reported by D&B). In each instance, the establishments was over 5 years in age.
For that reason, we classified all law firms in D&B with missing age information as over 5 years in age (i.e. as old
establishments).
15
There are also several spikes in the density estimation, indicating rounding errors in the sales per worker data.
The rounding errors are likely to be caused by the fact that firms tend to report sales rounded by thousands of
dollars. We will discuss how to deal with the rounding errors in Section 4.
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(www.ipums.org)16 Full-time workers were coded as those who report working at least 35 hours
per week and 40 weeks per year.17 Hourly wage was used as a proxy for productivity.
Individual hourly wage is calculated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours
worked, where the later is given by weeks worked by usual hours worked per week. As above,
we trim the top and bottom 1% of the sample based on hourly wages. Also analogous to above,
we pre-clean the data by regressing individual wage on age fixed effects, education fixed effects,
occupation fixed effects and industry fixed effects.18 We retain the wage residual from each
worker and calculate the adjusted wage for each worker by adding coefficient from the constant
term to the wage residuals that restores the original sample mean. We clean the wage data for
skilled (college degree or more) and low-skilled (high school degree or less) workers
separately.19
MSA population size is estimated using the 2000 census. 20 We retain only those MSAs
for which all of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) more than 100 married female nonHispanic white workers with a college degree or more present, (ii) more than 100 married female
non-Hispanic white workers with a high school degree or less present, and (iii) MSA total
population is over 100,000. The data cleaning procedure leaves us a sample composed of

16

We obtain the sample through the IPUMS website (Steven et al., 2015). Samples from Alaska and Hawaii are
excluded. We only use non-Hispanic white workers sample because discrimination against certain ethnic groups
may affect the observed wage distribution in a fashion that may be related to city size. We also restrict the sample to
native-born.
17
We focus on full-time workers in part to reduce measurement error when calculating hourly wages which is more
pronounced among part-time workers. See Baum-Snow and Neal (2009) for related discussion.
18
To be specific, there are 15 age fixed effects, 359 occupation fixed effects and 94 industry fixed effects. In the
census, the most detailed version of occupation classification is at 6 digits, which is too refined that certain
occupations do not have enough sample size to yield precise estimates of fixed-effects. Therefore, we choose to
control for occupation fixed effects using 5-digit classification. As a robustness check, we find that controlling for
occupation fixed effects at 4-digit or 6-digit level also yield similar results.
19
This approach does not prevent the adjusted wage from being negative. And there are indeed a few instances that
the adjusted wage is negative in our sample. It does not affect our analysis.
20
The population estimate is obtained through the IPUMS website. Link: https://usa.ipums.org/usaaction/variables/MET2013#description_section
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152,704 skilled married female workers and 153,168 low-skilled married female workers from
216 MSAs in the United States.
Table 1, Panel B provides summary statistics of adjusted hourly wage for the married
female workers. Measured at the mean and each quantile, the adjusted hourly wage is higher
among the skilled workers. Figure 8 Panel A and B present kernel density plots of the adjusted
hourly wage for low- and high-skilled workers. The first thing to note is that both distributions
are single-peaked. The density plot for the skilled workers (Panel A) also has a longer right tail
and a larger variance as compared to the plot for low-skilled workers (Panel B). Splitting the
samples into small and large MSAs, we reproduce the density plots in Panels C and D. For both
groups of workers, the wage density plots for large cities is right-shifted and dilated as compared
to the density plot for small cities.

3.4. Male full-time white workers in the 2000 Census
Male non-Hispanic white full-time workers (age 25-54) data is also drawn from the 5%
PUMS of the 2000 decennial Census. These data are cleaned in the same way as for the married
female workers. This leaves us with 383,728 workers with a college degree or more and 393,598
have a high school degree or less. These workers are spread 262 MSAs in the United States.
Table 1, Panel C summarizes the adjusted hourly wage for the skilled (college degree or more)
male workers and low-skilled male workers (high school degree or less).
Unsurprisingly, the skilled workers have higher adjusted hourly wage than the lowskilled group, both at various quantiles and also at the mean. Figure 9, Panels A and B display
kernel density plots of the adjusted hourly wage for the two groups of male workers. In both
panels, the aggregate adjusted wage distributions are single-peaked. Splitting the samples into
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small and large cities (Panels C and D, respectively), it is also evident that the wage density for
large cities is also right-shifted and dilated as compared to the density plot for smaller cities,
similar to the patterns for the married female sample.

4. Measuring the mode
Our estimation procedure requires that we measure the modal value of the outcome
variables (e.g. sale/worker, wage) in each MSA. We illustrate how this is done using law
establishment sale per worker data.
We first discretize the sales per worker distribution in each MSA by rounding the sales
per worker values to the closest integral using a fixed bandwidth. The choice of rounding
bandwidth will be discussed shortly. Then we define the modal sales per worker of each city as
the rounded point that has the highest frequency in each MSA’s discretized sales per worker
distribution.
We use this method mainly for two reasons. First, discretizing sales per worker using a
fixed bandwidth across cities ensures comparability across MSAs and different samples. Second,
discretizing as above mitigates measurement error associated with rounding when the raw data
are reported. As shown in Figure 7a, the density plot of sales per worker includes a number of
spikes that likely arise from rounding in the reported values. Discretizing the data using a fixed
bandwidth likely eliminates or at least greatly reduces rounding error associated with the
reported values.21

21

We exam the finite sample property of our approach using data simulation. We find that model estimates using
our approach are consistent. Results available upon request. As another robustness check, we also identify the mode
from kernel density estimation, allowing the bandwidth to vary across cities. We find that estimation results from the
two methods are very similar.
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A key part of the procedure above is the choice of bandwidth used to discretize the data.
If the bandwidth is too narrow, the discretized distribution will converge towards a uniform
distribution with a poorly defined mode. If the bandwidth is too wide, variation in discretized
values will be so reduced that it will not be possible to discern meaningful patterns since all of
the data would eventually be coded to a single cell. It is necessary, therefore, to select a
bandwidth that balances these two extremes.
We begin by first documenting the inter-quartile range for the sales per worker
distribution. In Table 1, Panel A, the inter-quartile range for the law firm sales per worker is
roughly $20,000 to $25,000 for all three main samples, including all law firms, young and old.
Next, we compare the density plots for sales per worker in small and large cities in Figure 7b. In
all three panels in the figure (for all law firms, young and old), the difference in modal sales per
worker between large and small cities is less than $20,000. This suggests that any bandwidth
larger than $10,000 would likely not preserve enough variation in the data.
Figure 10a presents histograms of the aggregate sales per worker data using a $5,000
bandwidth. It is evident that there is a well-defined mode in the distributions for all three groups
of firms (all law firms, young and old). Figure 10b, Panels B and C, provide analogous
histograms using alternative bandwidths. When we decrease the rounding bandwidth to $2,500 in
Panel B, many of the adjacent histograms have similar height and the mode is not longer well
defined. When we increase the bandwidth to $7,500 in Panel C, the histograms become very
thick and we lose considerable variation.
For the reasons above, we choose a $5,000 bandwidth to discretize the sales per worker
data in each city.22 Using that bandwidth, Table 2, Panel A summarizes modal sales per worker

22

We discuss the robustness of the modal estimates to bandwidths from $4,000 to $6,000 later in the paper.
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estimates across MSAs. The difference in the minimum and maximum modal sales per worker is
about $20,000 for all three groups of firms, consistent with the plots in Figure 7b.
The same procedure as above was used to select the bandwidths when measuring the
wage distributions for married women and prime age men. In both samples the bandwidth was
set equal to $3.
For women, in Table 1, Panel B the interquartile range of adjusted wage is $10 for the
skilled married female workers and $5 for the low-skilled female workers. From the distribution
plots in Figure 8, Panels C and D, the difference in the modal adjusted hourly wage between the
small and the large cities is less than $5.23 Figure 11a provides histograms of the adjusted hourly
wage based on a $3 bandwidth. It is evident that there is a well-defined mode for both low- and
high-skilled workers. Distribution plots in Figure 11b based on bandwidths of $1 and $5 do not
perform as well. With a $1 bandwidth the mode is not well defined while the $5 bandwidth
eliminates much of the variation in the distribution. Table 2, Panel B summarizes the wage
distribution using a $3 bandwidth. Across the 216 MSAs, the minimum and maximum modal
wages are $15 and $30 for the skilled married women, and $12 and $18 for the low-skilled
married women.
For prime age men, Table 2 Panel C summarizes modal adjusted hourly wage estimates
based on the discretized data. The minimum and maximum modal adjusted wages are $21 and
$39 for the skilled male workers and $9 to $21 for the low-skilled male workers. Figure 12a plots
histograms of the adjusted hourly wages using a $3 bandwidth. All panels have a well-defined
mode. As a comparison, Figure 12b provides histograms using $1 and $5 as the alternative
bandwidths. Analogous to the patterns for women, the $1 bandwidth (Panel B) is too refined to

23

We also discuss the robustness of the results by varying the bandwidth from $2 to $4 in the empirical section.
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effectively define the mode and the $5 bandwidth (Panel C) is too wide to preserve variation in
the wage measure.

5. Empirical Results
5.1. Old and young law firms: Threshold effects
Table 3 presents regression results based on the law firm sales per worker. All
regressions are at MSA-level. Panel A reports the regression for all firms. Panel B reports the
regression for young law firms and Panel C reports estimates for older firms. In all cases, column
(1) reports estimates from the first regression that uses the CDF evaluated at the mode as the
dependent variable. Column (2) reports estimates from the second regression that uses log sales
per worker at the mode as the dependent variable. Column (3) reports estimates using log sales
per worker at the mean as the dependent variable in and column (4) reports coefficient difference
test between the modal return (column 2) and the mean return (column 3).
Recall from Proposition 1 in Section 2, that selecting out establishments disproportionally
to the left of the mode will cause the CDF evaluated at the mode to decline in value. This pattern
should be most evident in larger cities if selection effect increases with city size. Table 3 column
(1) tests for these patterns by reporting results of OLS regressions of the CDF evaluated at the
mode on log population of the MSA. Consider first Panel A which reports estimates for all firms
(including both young and old), the coefficient on log population is -0.02 with a t-ratio of 3.81.
This indicates that, for all firms together, doubling city size reduces the CDF evaluated at the
mode by 2 percentage points. This estimate confirms that selection is present and that on net
weaker firms are selected out in large cities.
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As discussed in the Introduction, comparing old and newly established law firms can
highlight the effect of threshold-based selection. In Panel B column (1), the coefficient on log
population is positive and significant (0.0158 with a t-ratio of 2.81), indicating the absence of
threshold-based selection among the young firms. In comparison, the coefficient estimate for old
firms is -0.023 with a t-ratio of 2.73 in Panel C column (1). The sharp contrast between the
young and old firm results demonstrates that threshold-based selection in large cities is
concentrated among older companies. That is consistent with a view that lawyers may not
initially have full information on their ability to operate a profitable law firm. Partly for that
reason, we expect a broader distribution of productivity among young law firms as aspiring
lawyer-entrepreneurs are tempted to run their own firm. Over time, weaker lawyers discover they
are not profitable and exit, contributing to the sharper pattern of selection for older companies.
Table 3 column (2) and (3) report regression estimates of the elasticity of sales per
worker with respect to city size. As discussed earlier, we expect estimates based on the mean to
be upward biased when a selection effect is present. Estimates based on modal establishments
should be largely free of threshold-based selection and lower for that reason. In Panel A, column
(2) the elasticity of sale per worker with respect to MSA size is 1 percent when measured using
the modal firms. The corresponding estimate at the mean (column 3) is 1.69 percent. From the
coefficient difference test in column (4), the return to city size measured at the mean is 0.6
percentage points higher than the return to city size measured at the mode. This pattern is
consistent with our prior that selection effects should upward bias estimates of the return to city
size when measuring based on the mean relative to the mode. The coefficients for older
companies in Panel C are quite close numerically to the all firms sample in Panel A. For younger
companies, however, a very different pattern is present. In Panel B, the coefficient based on the
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modal firms in column (1) is 3.05 percent, notably higher than corresponding values of 1.74
based on the mean (column 3). These patterns are in sharp contrast to the patterns for older
establishments.
Estimates in Table 3 are based on discretized distributions using a $5,000 bandwidth. To
examine the robustness of the results with respect to bandwidth choice, we also estimated our
models several additional times varying the bandwidth from $4,000 to $6,000 in $200
increments. Figures 12a and 12b plot the resulting estimates.
The three panels in Figure 13a (for all law firms, young and old) report coefficient plots
for the first step regression with the CDF evaluated at the mode as the dependent variable. From
all three panels, the coefficient estimates largely remain stable when we vary the rounding
bandwidths from $4,000 to $5,500. Within that range, the coefficient estimates for the all firms
and old firms sample are less than zero (denoted by the red dashed horizontal line), while the
coefficient estimates for the young firms are consistently larger than 0. Based on the 95%
confidence interval, the differences are also statistically significant. Beyond the $5,500 range,
coefficient estimates become unstable in all three panels. The general pattern from this exercise
is that the results based on CDF evaluated at the mode is largely stable with respect to rounding
bandwidth choice.
Figure 13b present analogous coefficient plots for the elasticity of modal return to city
size. The red dashed line in each panel represents the elasticity of mean return to city size from
the corresponding sample. In this instance, it is apparent that the elasticity estimate of the modal
return is sensitive to bandwidth choice. One explanation for this pattern is that the true elasticity
of modal return with respect to city size is likely no larger than 5 percent given previous
estimates in the literature. Relative to that value, over or underestimating the mode by even a few
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percentage points would be substantial relative to the anticipated return from a doubling of city
size. This highlights a power issue for the law firm second regression. In contrast, the first step
regression based on the CDF evaluated at the mode is much less sensitive to noise in the modal
estimates as is apparent from the results discussed above.
Summarizing, the different estimates in Table 3 support the anticipated view that
threshold-based selection will tend to cause weaker companies to drop out over time. Controlling
for threshold effects, estimates suggest that doubling city size increases modal law firm
productivity by roughly 1 percent. This is on the lower side of many estimates reported in the
literature, where recent reviews suggest that most estimates are between 2 and 5 percent
(Rosenthal and Strange (2004); Combes and Gobillon (2015)). However, it is also worth noting
that nearly all estimates to date have focused on manufacturing and we are not aware of any that
have been based exclusively on law firms.

5.2. Married full-time working women: Threshold and migration effects
Table 4 reports results based on the married female wage data. Panel A displays estimates
based on the skilled (college degree or more) female workers sample while Panel B displays
results for low-skilled workers.
Column (1) in each panel reports estimates based on the CDF evaluated at the mode. In
Panel A, the coefficient on log MSA population is -0.02 with a t-ratio of 3.02. This suggests that,
among the skilled married women, selection effects in larger cities disproportionally drive less
productive individuals out of the full-time labor market. The presence of selection implies that
the return to city size measured at the mean should be upward biased and higher than the return
measured at the mode. These predictions are confirmed in Panel A, columns (3) and (4). The
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wage elasticity with respect to city size is 2.3 percent measured at the mode and 4.3 percent
measured at the mean. Both estimates are statistically different from zero and from each other.
This later point is confirmed in column (4) which reports a formal test of the difference between
the two estimates. These patterns are consistent with our prior that failing to account for selection
upward biases estimates of the return to city size.24
Consider next the results in Table 4, Panel B for low-skilled (high school degree or less)
married women. In column (1), the estimated effect of log population on the CDF evaluated at
the mode is -0.007 and not statistically different from zero. This suggests that selection is largely
absent which further suggests that the return to city size measured at the mean and the mode
should be similar. This prediction is confirmed in Panel B, columns (2) and (3). The elasticity of
return to city size is 3.8 percent measured at the mode and 3.9 percent measured at the mean.
Both estimates are statistically different from zero while column (4) confirms that the two
estimates are not statistically different from each other.
Results in Table 3 were obtained for a discretized wage distribution using a $3
bandwidth. Figure 14a plots coefficient estimates based on the CDF evaluated at the mode for
bandwidths ranging from $2 to $4 in $0.20 increments. In Panel A, the coefficient estimate on
log population is smaller than zero (the horizontal red dashed line) and remains stable throughout
different bandwidth. In Panel B, for the low-skilled population, the pattern is also consistent with
the results in Table 3; in this case, the coefficient estimates are not statistically different from
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Recall from Figure 6, Panel C, that the kernel density plot for married female wages in large cities is dilated
relative to the density plot for workers in small cities. Given the discussion in Section 2.1, this pattern implies that
productivity spillovers in large cities may be disproportionally beneficial to the more productive individuals.
Therefore, it is worth to emphasize that the elasticity estimate from Panel A column (2) is the productivity return to
city size for the modal workers. Since mode measures the most frequent value in a distribution, the modal adjusted
hourly wage is a meaningful central tendency measure in our study. Therefore, we believe that the 2.3 percent
estimated modal return is an important and credible measure of spillover effects as compared to the mean, especially
given the presence of selection effects.
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zero in most instances.25 Figure 14b present coefficient plots for the second step wage elasticity
at mode. Different from the law firm sale per worker sample, in this instance the coefficient
estimates are stable across the different bandwidths and close to estimates in column 2 of Table
3.
Summarizing, for college educated married women, there is compelling evidence that
selection effects in larger cities disproportionally drive less productive workers out of the fulltime market. Consistent with that pattern, doubling city size increases wages for college educated
women by 2.3 percent measured at the mode and 4.3 percent measured at the mean. For the lowskilled married women evidence of selection effects associated with city size are largely absent,
and doubling city size increases wage by roughly 3.8% at both the mode and the mean.

5.3. Male full-time workers: Migration effects
As discussed earlier, because male labor supply is very inelastic, migration is likely the
dominant mechanism by which selection affects wage distributions. Table 5 reports estimates for
this sample.
Focus first on Panel A which reports estimates for college educated men. In column (1),
the impact of log population on the CDF evaluated at the mode is -0.008 with a t-ratio of 1.79.
This is consistent with migration of more productive workers into larger cities. Consistent with
that pattern, the wage elasticity with respect to city size is 2.5% when measured at the mode (in
column 2) and 4.5% when measured at the mean (in column 3). In column 4, that difference in
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Although there is a visible drop in the coefficient estimate using around the bandwidth of $3.5, it is likely to be
caused by limited variation in the modal wage estimates. Recall from Table 1 Panel B, the majority of the adjusted
hourly wage for the low-skilled workers fall within the range of $12 to $18. Therefore, any rounding bandwidth that
is large than $3 may yield modal estimates that have limited variation across cities.
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estimates is significant, providing further evidence that among college educated men, unusually
productive individuals tend to sort into larger cities.
Results for low-skilled men are presented in Panel B of Table 5. Findings mirror those for
married women. In column (1), notice that there is no evidence that the CDF evaluated at the
mode changes with respect to city size, consistent with an absence of sorting by unobserved skill
into larger cities. In the absence of systematic sorting, the return to city size measured at the
mean and at the mode should be similar. In Panel B, columns (2) and (3), the elasticity estimate
is 4.4% measured at the mode and 3.6% measured at the mean. Although the point estimate of
the modal return is higher than at the mean, the difference is statistically significant at only the
10% level (in column 4). In addition, the two estimates are not systematically different from each
other for plausible alternative bandwidths used to discretize the data as shown in Figure 14.
Figure 15a presents coefficient estimate plots based on the CDF regression using
different bandwidth. It is evident that the coefficient estimates in both panels remain stable and
consistent with the results in Table 5 column (1). Figure 15b presents coefficient estimate plots
for the elasticity of return to city size measured at the mode. A very stable pattern also emerges.
Especially, Panel B shows that the modal return to city is not statistically different from the mean
return to city size for the low-skilled workers.
To summarize, the patterns for male full-time workers indicate that among college
educated individuals, migration tends to draw unusually productive individuals to larger cities.
The elasticity of wage with respective city size is 2.5% measured at the mode compared to 4.5
percent measured at the mean. For low-skilled male full-time workers, there is no evidence of
migration-related selection.
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6. Conclusion
This paper develops a new method to identify and control for selection when estimating
the productivity effects of city size. Different from previous papers, we emphasize that for single
peaked factor return distributions, selecting out low-performing agents has no effect on modal
productivity but reduces the CDF evaluated at the mode. Spillovers from agglomeration have the
reverse effect. We show that these patterns hold regardless of whether selection arises from the
decision to participate or location choice.
We estimate our model using three different data sets, each of which highlights different
features of the approach. This includes establishment-level data for newly formed and older law
firms, wages for full-time working married women, and wages for full-time working (prime age)
men. Results from all three exercises yield robust and compelling evidence that selection
contributes to urban productivity. The exception is for women and men with high school or less
education. For that group, evidence of selection effects is largely absent.
Our results confirm that in many instances, failing to control for selection leads to
overestimates of the returns to city size. For prime age, college educated men, for example,
doubling city size increases productivity by 4.5 percent evaluated at the mean but just 2.5 percent
evaluated at the mode.
Our approach can be applied to other contexts provided the underlying modeling
assumptions are met. Those key features include that the underlying latent productivity
distribution is sufficiently single-peaked with a well-defined mode, tht the selection process is
not too extreme, and that the observed mode can be estimated with sufficient precision. Our
method is also especially salient when modal values of the outcome measure are of intrinsic
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interest. However, even when that is not the case, the CDF evaluated at the mode can be used to
test for the presence and nature of selection.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the individual-level data
Panel A
Sales per worker (controlling for type of law firms) for law establishments
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
th

All Firms
Young Firms (<= 5 years)
Old Firms (> 5 years)

College degree or more
High school degree or less

5 quantile
46,666
38,422
48,255

th

25 quantile
59,000
52,287
60,000

th

50 quantile
67,609
60,000
70,000

th

75 quantile
82,222
70,000
84,261

th

95 quantile
121,446
96,531
123,541

Panel B
Adjust wage for married non-Hispanic white female full-time workers, age 25-54
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
5th quantile
25th quantile
50th quantile
75th quantile
95th quantile
10.27
17.85
22.66
28.09
41.95
9.01
12.51
15.01
18.10
25.17

(6)

(7)

mean
72,639
62,735
74,194

Observation
545,873
74,079
471,794

(6)
mean
24.08
15.75

(7)
Observation
152,704
153,168

Panel C
Adjust wage summary statistics for male non-Hispanic white full-time workers, age 25-54
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
th
th
th
th
th
5 quantile
25 quantile
50 quantile
75 quantile
95 quantile
mean
Observation
6.59
21.17
29.08
37.52
81.18
32.49
383,728
College degree or more
6.83
12.74
15.38
19.75
29.58
16.40
393,598
High school degree or less
Note: Law firm data are from Dun and Bradstreet for December 2016. The sample is restricted to single-site firms which excludes roughly 2
percent of establishments. MSAs are restricted to those with 100,000 or more population that have at least 30 or more law firms present for both
young and old classifications of law firms. Married female individual-level data are obtained from the 2000 Census. Hourly wage is adjusted by
controlling for age, education, occupation and industry fixed effects. The sample is restricted to cities with at least 100,000 or more population
that have at least 100 or more observation in each education category.

80

Table 2: Summary statistics of the mode estimates across MSAs
Panel A
Modal sales per worker estimates for law establishments
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Min
Max
Median
Mean
All Firms
50,000
70,000
55,000
57,562
Young Firms (<= 5 years)
45,000
65,000
55,000
55,659
Old Firms (> 5 years)
50,000
75,000
55,000
58,075

(5)
Std.
4,383
3,781
4,867

(6)
Observation
239
239
239

Panel B
Modal wage estimates for married white non-Hispanic full-time female workers, aged 25-54
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Min
Max
Median
Mean
Std.
Observation
15.00
27.00
21.00
21.27
2.29
216
College degree or more
12.00
18.00
15.00
14.03
1.56
216
High school degree or less
Panel C
Modal adjusted wage summary statistics for male non-Hispanic white full-time worker, age 25-54
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Min
Max
Median
Mean
Std.
Observation
21.00
39.00
27.00
27.52
2.98
262
College degree or more
9.00
21.00
15.00
13.78
1.79
262
High school degree or less
Note: Law firm data are from Dun and Bradstreet for December 2016. The sample is restricted to single-site firms
which excludes roughly 2 percent of establishments. MSAs are restricted to those with 100,000 or more population
that have at least 30 or more law firms present for both young and old classifications of law firms. Individual-level
data are obtained from the 2000 Census. Wage is adjusted by controlling for occupation, industry, age and
education fixed effects. The sample is restricted to cities with at least 100,000 or more population that have at least
100 or more observation in each education category. Bandwidth used to define modal wage is $3. Bandwidth
used to define modal sales per worker is $5,000.
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Table 3: OLS results based on law establishments

Panel A: All Firms
Log population in MSA
R-squared
Observations
Panel B: Young Firms (<= 5 years)
Log population in MSA
R-squared
Observations

(1)
(2)
(3)
CDF of
Sale/Worker
evaluated at the Log(Sale/Work Log(Sale/Work
Mode
er) at the Mode er) at the Mean
-0.0210
0.0105
0.0169
(-3.81)
(2.20)
(7.23)
0.058
0.021
0.164
239
239
239

0.0158
(2.81)
0.022
239

0.0305
(9.75)
0.224
239

Panel C: Old Firms (> 5 years)
Log population in MSA

0.0174
(6.44)
0.003
239

(4)
Coefficient
difference (3) (2)
0.0064
(1.68)
0.012
239

-0.0131
(-3.94)
0.041
239

-0.0226
0.0084
0.0163
0.0080
(-3.28)
(1.54)
(6.41)
(1.69)
0.054
0.012
0.132
0.154
R-squared
239
239
239
239
Observations
Note: T-ratios based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are from Dun and Bradstreet for December
2016. The sample is restricted to single-site firms which excludes roughly 2 percent of establishments. MSAs
are restricted to those with 100,000 or more population that have at least 30 or more law firms present for both
young and old classifications of law firms.
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Table 4: OLS results based on married female white full-time workers, age 25-54

Panel A: College degree or more
Log population in MSA
R-squared
Observations
Panel B: High school degree or less
Log population in MSA

(1)
CDF of wage
evaluated at the
Mode
-0.0195
(-3.02)

(2)

(3)

Log(wage) at
the Mode

Log(wage) at
the Mean

0.0232
(3.60)

0.0428
(9.98)

(4)
Coefficient
difference (3) (2)
0.0197
(3.43)

0.033
216

0.049
216

0.312
216

0.043
216

-0.0074
(-1.17)

0.0377
(6.50)

0.0388
(10.03)

0.0012
(0.24)

R-squared
0.005
0.126
0.291
0.000
Observations
216
216
216
216
Note: T-ratios based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Married female worker data are obtained from
the 2000 Census. Wage is adjusted by controlling for occupation, industry, age and education fixed effects. The
sample is restricted to cities with at least 100,000 or more population that have at least 100 or more observation
in each education category.
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Table 5: OLS results based on male white non-Hispanic full-time workers, age 25-54

Panel A: College degree or more
Log population in MSA
R-squared
Observations
Panel B: High school degree or less
Log population in MSA

(1)
CDF of wage
evaluated at the
Mode
-0.0082
(-1.79)

(2)

(3)

Log(wage) at
the Mode
0.0245
(4.70)

Log(wage) at
the Mean
0.0452
(12.58)

(4)
Coefficient
difference (3) (2)
0.0207
(3.87)

0.009
262

0.055
262

0.352
262

0.041
262

0.0014
(0.34)

0.0440
(6.88)

0.0361
(7.46)

-0.0079
(-1.75)

0.000
0.125
0.173
0.009
R-squared
262
262
262
262
Observations
Note: T-ratios based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Male worker data are obtained from the 2000
Census. Wage is adjusted by controlling for occupation, industry, age and education fixed effects. The
sample is restricted to cities with at least 100,000 or more population that have at least 100 or more
observation in each education category.
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Figure 1: Productivity Distributions with Agglomeration Economies
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Figure 2: Productivity Distributions with Threshold Effects

Note: This figure illustrates a case where 10% of the workers are selected out of the large city’s labor
market.
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Figure 3: Productivity Distributions with Agglomeration Economies and Threshold Effects
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Figure 4a: Small and Large City Productivity Distributions from Extreme Migration Effects
(Original Mode=0.85 and Migration Productivity Cutoff = 0.65)
Panel A: Small City

Panel B: Large City
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Figure 4b: Small and Large City Productivity Distributions from Extreme Migration Effects
(Original Mode=0.85 and Migration Productivity Cutoff = 1)
Panel A: Small City

Panel B: Large City
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Figure 5a: Productivity Distributions with Migration Effects

90

Figure 5b: Productivity Distributions with Agglomeration Economies and Migration Effects
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Figure 6: Slope Conditions and Shifts in the Mode
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Figure 7a: Sale per worker kernel density estimation for law firms in the Unites States

Panel A: All firms sample

Panel B: Young firms sample

Panel C: Old firm sample
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Figure7b: Sale per worker kernel density estimation for law firms in small versus large cities

Panel A: All firms sample

Panel B: Young firms sample

Panel C: Old firm sample
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Panel A:

Panel C:

Figure 8: Adjusted wage kernel density estimation for male white full-time worker, age 25-54
College degree or more (all cities together)
Panel B: High school degree or less (all cities together)

College degree or more (small versus large cities)

Panel D: High school degree or less (small versus large cities)
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Figure 9: Adjusted wage kernel density estimation for married female white full-time workers, age 25-54
Panel A: College degree or more (all cities together)

Panel C: College degree or more (small versus large cities)

Panel B: High school degree or less (all cities together)

Panel D:
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High school degree or less (small versus large cities)

Figure 10a: Histogram estimation of sale per worker for law firms (bandwidth $5,000)
Panel A: ALL firms sample

Panel B: Young firms (<= 5 years) sample

Panel C: Old firms (> 5 years) sample
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Figure 10b: Histogram estimation of sale per worker for law firm using different bandwidth
Panel A: bandwidth=5,000

Panel B: bandwidth=2,500

Panel C: bandwidth=7,500
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Figure 11a: Histogram estimation of adjusted wage for married female white
full-time workers (age 25-54), (bandwidth $3)
Panel A: College degree or more

Panel B: High school degree or less
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Figure 11b: Histogram estimation of adjusted wage for skilled (college degree or more)
married female white full-time workers (age 25-54) using different bandwidth
Panel A: bandwidth=3

Panel B: bandwidth=1

Panel C: bandwidth=5
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Figure 12a: Histogram estimation of adjusted wage for male white full-time workers
Panel A: College degree or more

Panel B: High school degree or less
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Figure 12b: Histogram estimation of adjusted wage for skilled (college degree or
more) male white full-time workers (age 25-54) using different bandwidth
Panel A: bandwidth=3

Panel B: bandwidth=1

Panel C: bandwidth=5
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Figure 13a: Law establishment modal CDF robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: ALL firms sample.

Panel B: Young firms (<= 5 years) sample.

Panel C: Old firms (> 5 years) sample.

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents value 0
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Figure 13b: Law establishment modal return robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: ALL firms sample.

Panel B: Young firms (<= 5 years) sample.

Panel C: Old firms (> 5 years) sample.

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents mean return for each sample.
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Figure 14a: Married female modal CDF robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: College degree or more

Panel B: high school degree or less

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents value 0.
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Figure 14b: Married female men modal return robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: College degree or more

Panel B: high school degree or less

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents mean return for each sample.
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Figure 15a: Male modal CDF robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: college degree or more

Panel B: high school degree or less

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents value 0.
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Figure 15b: Male modal return robustness check using different bandwidth
Panel A: college degree or more

Panel B: high school degree or less

Note: Red dashed horizontal line represents mean return for each sample.
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Abstract
African colonial history suggests that British colonial rule may have undermined state
centralisation due to legacies of ethnic segregation and stronger executive constraints. Using
micro-data from anglophone and francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we find that
anglophone citizens are less likely to identify themselves in national terms (relative to ethnic
terms). To address endogeneity concerns, we utilise regression discontinuity by focusing on
observations near anglophone–francophone borders, both across countries and within Cameroon.
Evidence on taxation, security and the power of chiefs also suggests weaker state capacity in
anglophone countries. These results highlight the legacy of colonial rule on state-building.

JEL Classification: F5, N0, R0

Key words: state capacity, colonial history, Africa.
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1. Introduction
Building an effective state that can enforce its laws, maintain stability, and provide public
infrastructure remains a major challenge for ethnically diverse countries. Various correlates of
ethnic tensions (e.g. fractionalisation, polarisation, segregation, interethnic income inequality)
have been shown to be associated with such adverse outcomes as slower economic growth, higher
incidence and duration of civil conflicts, weaker state capacity, and the underprovision of public
goods.1 The implications of these empirical patterns are especially severe in Africa owing to its
relatively high level of ethnic diversity. Despite the emphasis on the problem of weak state capacity
in Africa,2 the role of history—in particular, that of colonial legacies—is far from fully understood.
In this paper, we focus on the legacy of colonial occupation by the two largest colonial
powers—Britain and France—on state building in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature on
colonialism and African history suggests two possible reasons why the legacy of British rule may
differ from that of French rule. First, Britain adopted a ‘divide and rule’ strategy in which ethnic
identities played a central role. A prominent feature of British colonial rule was its emphasis on
native administration, a system of decentralised control in which the local population was
segregated along tribal lines and ruled indirectly by local chiefs. Native administration empowered
chiefs to rule over their respective local populations and instituted a rigid association between
one’s ethnic identity and access to basic resources (such as land and local government services).
In contrast, France’s colonial policy featured a more centralised approach in which ethnic
cleavages played a less significant role. Local administrative boundaries in French colonies did
not necessarily represent specific ethnic groups and, therefore, did not hinder various ethnic groups

1

See (Mauro(1995), Easterly and Levine(1997), Alesina ~al.(2003)Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, Miguel and
Gugerty(2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol(2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol(2005), Baldwin and Huber(2010), Alesina and
Zhuravskaya(2011), Hjort(2014), Alesina ~al.(2016)Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou).
2
For a detailed review, see (Acemoglu ~al.(2016)Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson).

111

from belonging to the same political unit. Moreover, the use of French as a common official
language was promoted throughout the colonies, encouraging language integration within the
colonial bureaucracy. The power of local chiefs was also suppressed. These differences in
approach to colonial rule suggest that the legacy of British rule may have undermined the
formation of a shared national identity across ethnic groups, empowered local chiefs and weakened
the central state.3
Second, the French and English legal systems have different implications for the power of
the executive. French civil law is often said to leave more political power and control in the hands
of the central state, whereas judicial independence from the executive is viewed as a defining
feature of British common law (Beck and Levine, 2005; La Porta et al., 2008). Under civil law,
the state could have a stronger legal power to centrally organise and control society (through
policies such as state ownership of enterprises and military conscription). However, the relatively
independent judiciary under common law may work against such a centralisation. Thus, the
differences in the executive power under the two legal traditions also suggest that state
centralisation might be relatively weaker in anglophone (than in francophone) countries because
of colonial ‘legal origins’.
Hence, British colonial rule, because of its approach to segregating ethnic groups and the
common law tradition, may well have undermined state centralisation. At the same time, it is far
from obvious whether this hypothesis is confirmed in the case of Africa (Herbst, 2014). Colonisers
faced enormous logistic challenges in the African hinterland owing to tropical diseases and a lack
of accessible roads. Herbst argues that the colonisers’ effective control over their official territories

3

See Dilley (1966); Crowder (1968); Miles (1994); Mamdani (1996); Acemoglu et al.
al. (2016).
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(2011); Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011); Acemoglu et

was quite limited and, as a result, it is far from certain whether differences in colonial policies had
a lasting impact on postcolonial state capacity.
In our empirical analyses, the main outcome variable is a micro-level indicator for the
strength of national (versus ethnic) identification in a sample of adult Africans. This variable
measures the extent to which individuals identify themselves with their countries as opposed to
their own ethnic groups. We focus on the strength of national identification as our main outcome
variable for two reasons. First, creating a sense of shared identity among citizens—a challenging
task in the context of ethnic rivalries—is an important component of state-building (Alesina and
Reich, 2013). Second, differences in the approaches to colonial rule and legal origins raise the
question of whether colonial legacies affected the sense of national identification in contemporary
Africa. One would expect that the legacy of ethnic segregation under British colonial rule fostered
interethnic rivalry and hindered the formation of shared national identity among citizens.
Furthermore, a stronger executive constraint in the British legal tradition would be expected to
limit the state’s power to implement national policies aimed at encouraging interethnic integration,
such as army conscription, centrally managed elementary education, and an expansive government
bureaucracy.
Besides the evidence on national identification, we also examine the relationship between
colonial rule and several different proxies for state capacity. The literature on state capacity
emphasises the ability to raise taxes and to maintain law and order as important factors in economic
development (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010, 2011). In the African context, it is often argued
that powerful traditional chiefs restrict the central state from exercising its control (Acemoglu et
al., 2016). Given the prominent role of chiefs under British colonial rule, one would expect chiefs
to have greater power in anglophone countries. Relatedly, the existence of more layers of hierarchy
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prior to contact with Europeans is robustly associated with greater development today (Gennaioli
and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014). We therefore examine the
empirical evidence on the association between British rule and state-capacity indicators for
taxation, security, and the power of traditional chiefs.
We use data from several rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys, which contain information
on nationally representative samples of adult citizens in a number of African countries. The
surveys provide data on about 100,000 respondents from twelve anglophone countries and nine
francophone countries. Preliminary comparisons between all the anglophone and francophone
respondents in our data show that anglophone respondents are less likely to identify themselves
with their countries than with their ethnic groups, providing suggestive evidence for a negative
association between the legacy of British rule and national identification.
As a first step in addressing endogeneity concerns, we exploit the wide geographic
coverage of the data set and implement regression discontinuity (RD) analysis focusing on a subset
of respondents from areas near the borders between anglophone and francophone countries. Given
the arbitrary nature of colonial borders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), the results of this
analysis help minimise the concern that precolonial differences between (what ended up being)
anglophone and francophone countries could confound the results owing to, for example, a
possible correlation between the coloniser’s identity and ethnic rivalries that predated colonialism
(Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). We find that the RD analysis also yields the same result:
anglophone respondents report a weaker sense of national identity. Using observations from
Cameroon, whose territory was divided between France and Britain, we carry out additional sets
of RD analysis in which the variation in colonial status comes from within the same country—
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thereby keeping country-level differences constant. The results from the Cameroon sample also
show a weaker sense of national identity among anglophone respondents.
The weaker sense of national identity among anglophones is consistent with the two
explanations offered previously: a weaker executive power in the British legal tradition and the
British approach to colonial rule (with respect to the role of ethnicity in colonial administration).
Directly isolating the effects of these two potential explanations is not possible because our
independent variable, namely the coloniser’s identity, does not distinguish between them.
Although the negative association between British rule and the strength of national identification—
consistent with the literature on colonialism and African history—remains the main empirical
contribution of this paper, our results also provide some evidence suggesting that the approach to
colonial rule (as opposed to legal traditions) is the more likely explanation. First, our result from
Cameroon relies on within-country variations in the coloniser’s identity, suggesting that the
difference in legal origins, which varies at country-level, is not the driving reason. Second, we
introduce several controls (such as citizens’ trust in the judiciary) that are plausibly associated with
legal origins. We find that the result is unchanged when these controls are added, suggesting that
differences in legal traditions do not affect the results.
We also examine a number of outcome variables to assess the evidence on taxation, chiefs’
power, and security. Many of these outcome variables are constructed from Afrobarometer surveys
on the experiences and attitudes of respondents regarding taxes, safety, and the role of chiefs in
their community. In particular, we use micro-level indicators for tax-compliance norms, the
strength of tax enforcement, the prevalence of extortion activities by non-state actors, the
prevalence of crimes (such as theft), and the power of traditional chiefs. In addition to the
Afrobarometer surveys, we also use two more data sets that provide georeferenced information on
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conflict events; this information is used to construct indicators for the prevalence of armed
conflicts.
The empirical patterns from these outcome variables also suggest weaker state capacity
among anglophones. As we show in Section 4, some of the estimated relationships between
colonial status and these variables are insignificant while many are significant. For example, of
the two security indicators that we sourced from Afrobarometer data, the first (prevalence of crime)
is insignificant in some of the specifications whereas the second (prevalence of extortion by nonstate actors) is significant across all specifications. Our indicator for the prevalence of armed
conflicts is also significantly higher in anglophone regions across most specifications. Although
anglophone respondents tend to report weaker tax enforcement and stronger power of chiefs, taxcompliance norms do not show significant differences. Crucially, however, the general pattern is
that all of the significant coefficients suggest a lower state capacity (i.e. weaker tax enforcement,
stronger power of chiefs, and less security) among anglophone countries. Thus, the broad picture
portrayed by these results—in line with the literature on colonial legacy and African history—is
one that associates the legacy of British rule with weaker state capacity.
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of history in state development, which
we complement by highlighting the role of colonial history in state-building.4 A strand of this
literature examines the effect of precolonial history on contemporary development. The seminal
study by Nunn (2008) shows how Africa’s slave trade is correlated with ethnic fractionalisation,
state development, and income (see also Nunn and Puga, 2012). Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
find an adverse effect of slave trade on trust levels; Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) explore the
relationship between precolonial interethnic conflict and the contemporary salience of ethnic

4

See Nunn (2014) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015, 2018) for a detailed review of the literature on the role of history in economic
development.
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identity; and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) document the impact of precolonial
institutions on subnational development.
Another strand of the historical literature studies the role of colonial history in postcolonial
development. A number of these studies use macro-level cross-country data (Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002; La Porta et al., 2008; Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2009). From a methodological standpoint, our
paper is closely related to the growing literature that utilise RD analysis of micro-level data to
examine colonial legacies (see, e.g., Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2010; Bubb, 2013; Pinkovskiy,
2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014, 2016; Baruah et al., 2017; Lechler and McNamee,
2017).However, none of these studies look at the effect of colonial rule on state-building in Africa.
We also contribute to the literature on the salience of ethnic identity in national politics.
Alesina and Reich (2013) develop a theoretical model of state-building in which the construction
of national identity (or ‘homogenisation of citizens’) is endogenised. Citing several historical
examples, Leeson (2005) argues that colonial rulers’ segregation of local populations along tribal
lines disrupted the interethnic cooperation that existed in precolonial Africa, thereby inhibiting the
integration of tribes and the formation of shared national identity.5 Eifert et al. (2010) report that
ethnic identity becomes more salient in response to increases in competition for political control
(as measured by proximity to election periods). Miguel (2004) compares post-independence
outcomes in Kenya and Tanzania to show that government policies, such as public school
curriculum and establishing a national language, can promote the formation of stronger national
identification. We complement this literature by highlighting the role of colonial history for the
salience of ethnic identification. More recently, Blouin and Mukand (2018) find that government
propaganda was effective in encouraging greater inter-ethnic trust and cooperation in Rwanda.

5

See also Leeson (2008) for a formal model incorporating this idea of cooperation through informal institutions.
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The rest of our paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief historical
review of the British and French approaches to colonial rule. Thereafter, results on the strength of
national identification are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we report results on taxation,
security, and the power of chiefs. Section 5 concludes.

2. Historical Background
The central component of British colonial rule was ‘native administration’. As outlined by
Frederick D. Lugard—the renowned colonial official whose extensive engagement in Africa
ranged from being a military commander in Nyasaland (1888) to governing Nigeria (1914–
1919)—the main tenet of native administration is that natives should be ‘administered’ by their
native chiefs in accordance with their native customs and on their native land (Lugard, 1922). In
practice, native administration was a fairly autonomous satellite institution in the hierarchy of
colonial bureaucracy, which segregated locals along tribal affiliations and controlled them via
locally powerful men (chiefs). Britain adopted this kind of indirect rule as a way of controlling the
local population with minimal cost (Chanock, 1985; Okoye, 2017). The more direct rule imposed
in Malawi and southern Nigeria during the early periods of colonial occupation (late 19th century)
proved to be too costly to sustain when—following the Berlin conference of 1884–1885—the
colonial territories expanded vastly to areas where the government had limited control.6 Hence,
native administration was imposed more or less throughout the territories in non-settler colonies,
such as Uganda and western Africa. In colonies that contained a large number of settler populations,
native administration was applied only to the locals within their reserves (Tinger, 1976; Chanock,
1985).

6

For a formal model of indirect rule, see Padró I Miquel and Yared (2012).
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The first key feature of native administration is the role of chiefs, who wielded significant
control over locals. Locally powerful men from the precolonial power structure (such as tribal
chiefs) were co-opted into the colonial administration, often by threatened or actual military
attacks (Crowder, 1964). In areas where identifiable tribes or tribal chiefs did not exist, the chiefs
were ‘invented’ and imposed on the locals (Khapoya, 2010). Backed by British military support,
chiefs ruled the local population and extracted taxes while being held accountable primarily to
their colonial master (i.e. the district commissioner). The chief presided over all branches of the
local government: he set the rules, acted as a judiciary, and controlled the administration. He also
appointed the subchiefs and village headmen.
The second main feature of native administration was segregating the local population
along tribal lines, which served to undermine cooperation among various ethnic groups and so
reduce the threat of a more unified and stronger resistance against colonial rule (Fanthorpe, 2001).
Boundary demarcations of the native administration units assigned collective ownership of land to
tribes, with the chief having the ultimate power to decide the allocation of plots among his subjects.
Thus, native administration instituted a rigid association between tribal identity and access to basic
resources, such as land and local government services.
Many scholars of African history argue that the natives’ tribal identity was relatively less
prominent in the French colonies (see, e.g., Whittlesey, 1937; Crowder, 1964; Miles, 1994;
Mamdani, 1996). First, the areas marked by local administrative boundaries did not necessarily
represent specific ethnic groups and often cut across preexisting political boundaries. Thus, they
did not prevent various ethnic groups from belonging to the same political unit. This approach was
in contrast to British rule, under which colonies were essentially organised as autonomous
collections of tribal authorities. Second, although the French also used chiefs in many instances,
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the power of those chiefs was often suppressed. French colonial law did not give chiefs the power
to allocate land among natives. It also retained most of the judicial power with the resident
commander (le commandant de cercle). Finally, chiefs were allowed relatively less autonomy in
appointing subchiefs and village headmen. Devoid of legal power to allocate land, control the local
judiciary, and appoint subchiefs, the chief’s primary role in French colonies was reduced to
executing the commander’s orders within an administrative bureaucracy. Hence, the colonial
bureaucracy under French rule, as compared with the native administrations in the British colonies,
was less dependent on the chief’s patronage network.
The prominence of native administration in British colonies meant that political rights were
tied to an individual’s ethnic identity and not to citizenship, thus undermining the practical
relevance of citizenship (Fanthorpe2001). The possibility of excluding others tended to induce
competition for resources and political influence along ethnic lines and foster rivalries. Schildkrout
(1970, pp. 374–75) notes that, in Ghana, the British demand for Kumasi residents to appoint their
own tribal headmen intensified rivalries among the various ethnic groups (e.g. the Hausa, Yoruba,
and Mossi) as each group rallied for more influence through its own headman.
Such interethnic rivalries can have a long-term effect on nation building. First, a sense of
animosity and mistrust among ethnic groups could persist for an extended period (Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Rohner et al., 2013). Furthermore, existing
divisions could be exploited by successive generations of politicians through ethnic favouritism,
reinforcing the initial cleavages. Finally, the continued prominence of tribal chiefs in postcolonial
anglophone countries means that ethnic identity could remain an important political factor.
In addition to undermining the construction of shared national identity, the existence of
powerful chiefs may also directly undermine state centralisation. Because the emergence of a
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strong central state is likely to threaten powerful local chiefs, they could have an incentive to use
their power to keep the state weak (Acemoglu et al., 2016).

3. Empirical Results: National Identity
To measure the strength of national identification, we construct a variable based on a
survey question about the respondent’s sense of national (relative to ethnic) identity. Respondents
were asked to describe their sense of identity by choosing one of five options: (1) only ethnic, (2)
more ethnic than national, (3) equally ethnic and national, (4) more national than ethnic, or (5)
only national. Our outcome variable, National identity, is a binary index that equals 1 if the
respondent chooses either option (4) or (5)—that is, if the respondent places more importance on
national than on ethnic identity. Otherwise, National identity equals 0. We obtain similar results
when using an alternative index that takes values ranging from 0 to 4, where higher values are
assigned to statements corresponding to a greater salience of national identity. The descriptive
statistics for National identity, and for all other variables to be used in our analysis, are presented
in Table 1.
We present our results in three stages, each corresponding to subsamples from different
geographic subunits. First, Section 3.1 presents the preliminary results using all observations in
our sample, which consists of about 100,000 respondents. These observations are drawn from
rounds 3–6 of the Afrobarometer surveys that covered twelve anglophone and nine francophone
countries (see Figure 1).
Section 3.2 presents the RD analyses that focus on observations near the anglophone–
francophone national borders of western African countries in our sample. Section 3.3 introduces
additional controls in order to examine whether the results can be explained by differences in legal
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origins. Section 3.4 concludes this section by presenting the RD results based on observations from
Cameroon.

3.1. Preliminary Results
We consider a model given by the following regression equation:
!" = $ + & × ()*+,-ℎ,)/" + 0 " ′Γ + 3" ,
where !" is the dependent variable and 5 indexes the respondent. ()*+,-ℎ,)/" is an indicator
for whether the respondent is from an anglophone country: it equals 1 for anglophone respondents
and 0 for francophones. Our coefficient of interest is &, which captures the difference between
anglophone and francophone respondents with respect to the outcome variable. The vector 0 "
includes a set of controls; these controls will be described later as they are introduced into the
regression estimations.7 Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, and a detailed description of
our data sources for each variable is given in the Appendix.
The first row of Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of National identity. We
see that, compared with francophone respondents, the share of anglophone respondents who
prioritise national identity is lower by 13 percentage points. That is, 55% of francophone
respondents prioritise national identity whereas only 42% of anglophones do so. Table 2 presents
the regression results using all observations in our sample. We report robust standard errors
clustered at both ethnicity and country levels (Cameron et al., 2011).8
The controls include several variables that could affect state-building; therefore, they
account for the possibility that the correlation between those variables and colonial status may

7

Non-linear probability models (logit or probit) yield qualitatively identical results. We report results from our linear model because it is more
straightforward in terms of both estimation procedure and interpretation (e.g. estimated effects represent mean percentage differences between
francophone and anglophone observations). The linear model is also less sensitive to distributional assumptions concerning the error terms, which
is important given our use of several dummy controls (cf. Angrist2008).
8
The results remain the same when we cluster at district (instead of ethnicity) and country levels.
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confound our results. We include controls at national, district, ethnicity, and individual levels. The
subnational and individual controls have the advantage of capturing variations across regions
and/or individuals. This advantage is especially important in Africa, where state capacity varies
significantly across regions because the central states tend to have limited control over areas
remotely located from capital cities.
In the first column, we report results with no controls (except fixed effects for survey
rounds). Column (2) includes region indicators (eastern, western, and southern Africa) as well as
an indicator variable for whether the country is landlocked. To account for the possible effect of
German occupation in some African countries, we include an indicator variable for whether a
country was a former colony of Germany. One francophone country (Togo) and two anglophone
countries (Namibia and mainland Tanzania) were German colonies prior to the First World War;9
when Germany was defeated, they were transferred to France and Britain.
The third column of Table 2 controls for several individual-level, socio-economic
characteristics of the respondents. These variables are all sourced from the Afrobarometer survey.
They include: indicator variables for the location of respondents (urban vs. rural) as well as their
employment status (employed vs. unemployed) and gender; nine indicators for education levels;
controls for age and age squared; eight fixed effects for the respondents’ religions; and three
indicators for asset ownership.
Column (4) includes the remaining controls. These include a range of variables to account
for historical, institutional, demographic, and economic factors. In selecting these controls, we
closely follow Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Nunn and Puga (2012). To account for

9

In addition, two anglophone countries—Ghana and Nigeria—had small portions of land transferred from German ownership (British Togo
joined Ghana, and part of the British Cameroon joined Nigeria). However, the major portion of these countries was under British rule and so they
are not considered to be former German colonies.
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precolonial legacies, we control for historical levels of the intensity of exposure to slave trade,
urbanisation, and complexity of institutions. The intensity of exposure to slave trade, which eroded
trust levels (including interethnic trust), may affect state-building by intensifying conflict and
hindering integration across ethnic groups (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Fenske and Kala, 2017).
This measure is constructed by dividing the total number of slaves exported from each ethnic group
by the size of land area that is historically inhabited by the ethnic group (Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011). Ethnic homelands are defined according to Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic Map. We use
village-level geographic data on the residence of each respondent to project the locations of
respondents on the Ethhnolinguistic Map.10 As a further control for exposure to slave trade, we
include the distance of each ethnic homeland from the nearest coast. The control for historical
levels of urbanisation is an indicator variable for whether the respondent is located in an ethnic
homeland that contained, in 1800, a city whose population was at least 20,000 (Chandler and Fox,
1974). This control is meant to account for the extent of precolonial economic development. Since
the complexity of precolonial institutions is found to be correlated with contemporary development
(Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), we include four dummies
to control for the number of precolonial jurisdictional hierarchies in each ethnic group (Murdock,
1967).
We include two controls to account for colonial activities. The first one, an indicator
variable for whether an ethnic homeland had a colonial railway station, is meant to account for
colonial investments in infrastructure (Dell and Olken, 2017). Since missionary activities by
Europeans—which tended to be more common in British colonies—may have lowered trust levels
and weakened traditional institutions (Okoye, 2017), we control for the number of missionary

10

We use geodata on Afrobarometer respondents from Knutsen et al. (2016) and AidData.

124

stations per area of each ethnic homeland. Data on these controls are from Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011).
In order to account for the potential effect of ethnic composition on interethnic
relationships (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Fer- rara, 2002), we
control for ethnic fractionalisation in the respondent’s district and the share of population in the
district that is of the same ethnicity as the respondent. In constructing both variables, we follow
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and use the sample of individuals in the Afrobarometer surveys.
Finally, we include two controls for the level of contemporary economic development in
the historical homeland of each ethnic group. Economic development may affect state capacity, as
the size of the formal sector tends to increase with the level of economic development (Besley and
Persson, 2011). Since reliable income data at subnational levels are not available, we follow the
recent literature and use the density of night-time light—based on satellite images—as a proxy for
economic activity (Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014; Pinkovskiy
and Sala-i Martin, 2016). Following Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014), we construct a
measure of light density per square kilometer for the period 2011–2013 by averaging across pixels
that lie within each ethnic group’s historical homeland.11 Since state capacity is likely to be lower
in areas farther from the capital city, we control for the distance of each ethnic homeland from the
capital.
According to our estimate in column (1) of Table 2, the coefficient for Anglophone is
negative and statistically significant. The share of respondents who prioritise national identity in
anglophone countries is lower by 12 percentage points, which reaffirms the mean difference

11

This 2011–2013 period corresponds to the years during which round 5 of the Afrobarometer surveys was undertaken.
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between anglophone and francophone respondents reported in Table 1. This result remains
significant when we incorporate the remaining controls in columns (2)–(4).

3.2. Evidence from Regression Discontinuity
Despite the inclusion of several controls, there may still be endogeneity concerns due to
possible confounding factors that are difficult to control. This could, for instance, be the case if
Britain’s policy of adopting native administration may have led it to target regions that already had
a strong sense of ethnic identity. On the other hand, France’s lack of such a motive may have led
it to focus on regions consisting of relatively homogeneous ethnic groups. If such a selection
strategy were operative, then current differences (i.e. between anglophone and francophone
countries) in the salience of ethnic identity may have existed prior to colonisation and thus would
not reflect colonial legacy.12 As a first step towards mitigating these endogeneity concerns, we
undertake RD analysis on a limited set of respondents who reside near national borders between
anglophone and francophone countries. The key assumption required to address the selection
problem in the RD analysis is that, prior to colonisation, anglophone and francophone regions
within the RD sample were not systematically different in terms of (un)observable factors that
could have affected the strength of national identification.
There is little disagreement among scholars of African history that most national borders
were drawn arbitrarily by colonisers.13 The colonisation of Africa happened rapidly. The borders
were drawn hastily in European capitals with little knowledge of local situations. As summarised

12

However, Wesseling (1996, pp. 177–78) argues that the massive French occupation in western Africa was driven more by the navy’s desire to
redeem itself from past humiliation than by any bona fide strategic concerns.
13
See Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) for a detailed review of the literature and for evidence on the arbitrariness of African border
demarcations by colonial powers.
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in the much cited statement by Lord Salisbury (then the British Foreign Secretary, later Prime
Minister) at the colonial powers’ 1884–1885 ‘carve-up’ conference in Berlin:
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet
have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other,
only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains
and rivers and lakes were. (Muiu, 2010, p. 1)
As a result, the borders typically divided communities that belonged to relatively
homogeneous groups that shared similar ethnicity, political organisation and agro–economic zones.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the arbitrariness of African borders also stands out in our RD sample.
This map projects Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic Map on country borders in western Africa
that are included in our RD analysis. The thickest lines show the borders between anglophone and
francophone countries. Three of the countries along those borders are anglophone (Ghana, Nigeria,
and Sierra Leone) and the rest are francophone (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger,
and Togo). The highlighted portion of the map shows the historical homelands that were split into
more than one country along the anglophone–francophone borders. Following Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2016), we define ‘split’ groups as historical homelands for which at least 10% of
their territories are found on both sides of a national border. A visual inspection of Figure 2 reveals
that, with few exceptions, the borders cut through ethnic homelands—affirming that the national
borders in our RD sample likewise reflect the largely arbitrary nature of most African borders.14
Of the 91 ethnic historical homelands in our RD sample, which covers the areas that lie
within 100 kilometers of anglophone–francophone national borders, the majority (51 groups) are
split between countries, suggesting that a significant portion of our RD regions come from

14

If we instead define split groups as ethnic homelands where at least 5% (rather than 10%) of the historical homelands are found on both sides
of a national border, then even more portions of the national borders will cut through ethnic homelands (and are thus rendered even more
arbitrary).
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communities that were unlikely to have systematic precolonial differences across national
borders. 15 Comparing the 40 non-split groups in anglophone and francophone countries with
respect to various observable precolonial characteristics—such as exposure to slave trade,
urbanisation in 1800, and levels of complexity in precolonial political organisations—we find that
the differences between those on francophone versus anglophone sides of the borders are
statistically insignificant.
Table 3 presents the estimated results. As a benchmark comparison, we begin by reporting
a regression result using all francophone and anglophone observations from western Africa; this
result is presented in the first column. We report the result with no controls to provide a transparent
comparison of the mean difference between all francophone and anglophone respondents in
western Africa. However, including the additional controls does not change the result. There are a
total of 43,013 observations from western Africa, which account for 44% of all the observations
in our data set. Columns (2)–(5) present regression results using only the observations in our RD
sample (i.e. observations within 100 km of an anglophone–francophone national border).16 This
RD sample includes nearly 13,000 observations, or about 30% of all observations in western Africa
(approximately 13% of the entire sample’s observations). Column (2) in the table includes no
controls except for survey-round fixed effects and national border fixed effects. Column (3)
controls for distance to the anglophone–francophone national borders (on either side). Columns
(4) and (5) include, respectively, the individual-level controls and the remaining controls; see
Table 2. We discuss column (6) in Section 3.3. All coefficients estimated from these regressions

15

We consider a historical homeland to be part of our RD sample if its geographic boundary overlaps the RD area.
The results are not sensitive to reasonable alternations of the cut-off (e.g. 60, 80, or 120 km). This insensitivity is intuitive in light of the RD
plots, which tend to show that the significant (resp., insignificant) results display (resp., do not display) visible shifts at the border.
16
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are significantly negative, which confirms the previous pattern that the strength of national
identification tends to be lower among anglophone respondents.
Figure 3 offers a visual display of the strength of national identification by distance to
border. The fitted lines represent the correlation between distance to national borders and National
identity along with their 95% confidence intervals (from an OLS regression of National identity
on distance). The dots mark local averages (in 10-km bins) of National identity and represent the
share of respondents who identify more with their country than with their ethnic group. The
advantage of an RD plot is that it provides a more transparent characterisation of the data. These
patterns are consistent with the findings reported in Table 3 on the anglophone side of the borders
(to the right of the 6-axis center point), the level of national identification tends to be lower.

3.3. Accounting for Legal Origin
As discussed in the Introduction, the literature on colonial legacy and African history
suggests two possible factors—namely, differences in approaches to colonial rule and legal
origin—that may associate the coloniser’s identity with state building. Directly isolating the effects
of these factors is not feasible because our independent variable (i.e. the identity of the coloniser)
does not distinguish between the two effects. Nevertheless, we examine this question by
controlling for variables that are reasonably presumed to be associated with legal origins. If the
results remain the same when we control for these variables, this provides suggestive evidence that
the effects are less likely to be driven by differences in legal origin.
The literature on colonial legacies emphasises that the British legal origin tends to be
associated with greater judicial independence than does the French (La Porta et al., 2004). This
judicial constraint on the executive’s power could limit the latter’s ability to control society and
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thus to strengthen the central state. The transmission of both institutions’ features—including legal
codes and such cultural values as attitudes towards political freedom—from colonisers to colonies
have been posited as channels through which legal origin may affect judicial independence (La
Porta et al., 2008). We therefore use three variables from the Afrobarometer data to control for
potential differences concerning the judiciary and attitudes towards political freedom.
The first variable measures the level of respondents’ trust in ‘the courts of law’. Respondents were
asked to choose one of the following options to express their level of trust in the courts: (1) not at
all, (2) just a little, (3) somewhat, and (4) a lot. Using this variable, we construct a binary control
that indicates whether the respondent chose one of the last two options or rather one of the first
two. We also checked the robustness of our results to alternative ways of defining the controls (e.g.
fixed effects for each type of response); we obtain similar results.
The other two variables measure respondents’ attitudes about political freedom. One of
them is based on a survey question that asked respondents to give their view of these two
statements: (A) ‘We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government
approves of it’; and (B) ‘Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its
policies’. The other variable is constructed from respondents’ answers to questions probing their
views about press freedom. They were asked to describe their attitude towards the following two
statements: (A) ‘The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without
government control’; and (B) ‘The government should have the right to prevent the media from
publishing things that it considers harmful to society’. To each of these two questions, the
respondents answered by choosing one of five options: (1) agree very strongly with Statement A,
(2) agree with Statement A, (3) agree with Statement B, (4) agree very strongly with Statement B,
or (5) agree with neither statement. Our indicators for respondents’ attitudes about freedom include
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two binary variables, one for each question, indicating whether they chose options (1) or (2)—that
is, agreeing with statements favouring greater freedom—or rather options (3), (4), or (5).
Column (6) of Table 3 reports estimation results (for the RD sample) when we include the
controls for trust in courts of law and attitudes towards political freedom. The coefficient for
Anglophone remains essentially the same, providing no indication that differences in legal
origins—as measured by trust in courts and attitudes towards political freedom—are driving the
results.

3.4. Evidence from Cameroon
Cameroon was first colonised by Germany in the mid-1880s. Following Germany’s defeat
in the First World War, Britain and France each controlled portions of Cameroon and split it into
two parts in 1919. Sections of south-western and northwestern Cameroon (bordering Nigeria)
became part of the British colony while the rest was colonised by France. After independence, the
two parts of Cameroon (except for the north-western part that joined Nigeria) reunited in 1961 to
form Cameroon as it is currently configured. After this reunification, Cameroon endured the
strongly authoritarian rule of President Ahmadu Ahidjo, whose Cameroon National Union was the
sole legal party during much of his rule. The Cameroon state’s authoritarian nature has essentially
continued until today under President Paul Biya, who succeeded Ahidjo in 1982. Freedom House
has classified Cameroon as ‘Not Free’ ever since 1999, the first year for which data were
available.17

17

Polity IV has likewise assigned negative scores in each of the years since 1960. Both Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2017) categorize Cameroon as a non- democracy.
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The Cameroon case offers a useful setting for RD analysis. First, the variation in colonial
rule comes from within Cameroon, allowing us to hold country-level differences constant. 18
Second, the colonial borders separating anglophone and francophone parts appear to be quite
arbitrary. Like most colonial borders in Africa, Cameroon was partitioned based on hastily
arranged agreements.19 Emphasising this arbitrariness in the demarcations, Lee and Schultz (2012,
p. 372) observe that ‘the most notable feature of the colonial border was the degree to which it cut
across existing ethnic and religious boundaries’. This feature is evident also in Figure 4, where the
map of Cameroon is projected onto Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic Map. The thick broken line
(within the outlined western territory) represents the anglophone–francophone border in Cameroon,
and the highlighted regions represent historical homelands of ethnic groups that were split between
francophone and anglophone Cameroon. We see that almost the entire anglophone–francophone
border cuts through historical homelands of ethnic groups. Third, there is a broad consensus in the
historical literature that the distinction between the French and British approaches to colonial rule
in Cameroon is very similar to the broader pattern observed in western Africa (see Section 2). In
effect, the British ruled Cameroon as an extension of Nigeria and instituted native administration.
Comparing the British and French colonial rule in Cameroon, Chiabi (1997, p. 27) notes that the
‘British had to determine who chiefs were and which areas constituted their jurisdictions. This . . .
occupied the British for a greater part of the interwar period. Meanwhile, the French took a
different approach. Assessment reports to restructure the country along the lines of chiefdoms was
not necessary.’ As in most of their colonies in western Africa, the French undermined the chiefs’
autonomy, ‘treating them as petty bureaucrats who can be hired and fired at will’ (Lee and Schultz,
2012, p. 375). The legacy of this distinction was noticed soon after independence, when

18
19

According to La Porta et al. (1999), Cameroon has a civil law legal tradition.
The border was established in March 1916 (Elango, 2014).

132

anglophone Cameroon ‘maintained their House of Chiefs. Their counterparts in the French
tradition saw no need for a House of Chiefs and abolished it in 1971’ (Chiabi, 1997, p. 22).
The data are drawn from the last two rounds (i.e. rounds 5 and 6) of the Afrobarometer
surveys, which included Cameroon. The country has ten administrative regions; of these, four are
contiguous with the anglophone–francophone border. In Figure 4, the western part of the focal
area includes these four regions, and the observations from those regions constitute the sample
used for our RD analysis.20
The RD estimates using the Cameroon data are reported in Table ??. Column (1) presents
a benchmark comparison from the sample consisting of all respondents in Cameroon, and columns
(2)–(6) present results from the RD sample. Column (2) reports the estimated results in which we
include no controls; the controls listed in the table are progressively added in the subsequent
columns. Results from the Cameroon sample are similar to our previous results: the sense of
national identity is significantly lower among anglophone respondents. The RD plot for the
Cameroon sample is displayed in Figure 5, where again the dots mark local averages (in 10-km
bins) of National identity. This RD plot, too, indicates that the strength of national identification
is lower among anglophone respondents.

4. Additional Results: Taxation, Security, and the Power of Chiefs
This section presents the empirical evidence on indicators of state capacity that are related
to taxation, security, and the power of chiefs. We first present results for outcome variables that
are sourced from the Afrobarometer data set. These variables provide information on the
experiences and attitudes of respondents regarding taxation, safety, and the role of chiefs. We then

20

We include all observations within those regions because Cameroon’s anglophone part is quite small; the maximum distance from the
anglophone–francophone border (before it crosses into Nigeria) is less than 100 km.
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present results for security indicators constructed by using additional data sets that provide
geocoded data on incidents of armed conflict. The descriptive statistics for these outcome variables
are presented in Table 1.
For all outcome variables, we report results for the whole sample in addition to RD results
for observations near the anglophone–francophone national borders in western Africa. Since
conflicts tend to be rare events, conflict data do not provide sufficient variation to undertake RD
analysis within Cameroon. 21 Hence, RD results from Cameroon are limited to the outcome
variables that we source from the Afrobarometer data set.

4.1. Results from Afrobarometer Data
4.1.1. Outcome variables
Taxation. We consider two outcome variables on taxation, Compliance norm and Evasion
difficulty. The data used to construct each variable are sourced from rounds 5 and 6 of the
Afrobarometer surveys. Compliance norm measures respondents’ moral views about tax evasion;
it is therefore viewed as being indicative of the strength of social norms against tax evasion.
Respondents describe their views regarding tax evasion by choosing one of three ranked statements:
tax evasion is (1) not wrong at all, (2) wrong but understandable, or (3) wrong and punishable. We
construct Compliance norm as a binary index, which is set equal to 1 if the respondent chooses
statement (3) and is set to 0 otherwise.22
Evasion difficulty is meant to measure the state’s ability, as perceived by survey
respondents, to enforce tax compliance. Based on their experiences with government services,
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Except for some positive values for One-sided violence from UCDP, both ACLED and UCDP report zero conflict incidents in Cameroon.
Most of the outcome variables are binary indicators. However, alternative indexes that allow for more than two values—and with respect to
which we apply ordered logit or probit models—yield qualitatively similar results.
22
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respondents were asked to describe evading taxes as being (1) very easy, (2) easy, (3) difficult, or
(4) very difficult. We set Evasion difficulty to 1 if the respondent chooses response (3) or (4) and
set it to 0 otherwise.
Security. We consider two indicators as proxies for security: Extortion prevalence and
Crime prevalence. The former is an indicator for the extent to which the state protects its citizens
from extortion by non-state actors. Respondents were asked ‘how often powerful groups other than
the government, such as criminals or gangs, forced people in their community to pay them in return
for protecting them, their property or their businesses’. Respondents answered by choosing one of
four options: (1) never, (2) only once, (3) a few times, or (4) often. We set Extortion prevalence
to 0 if the respondent replied ‘never’ but to 1 for all other responses. Data on this variable are from
round 5 of the survey.
Crime prevalence is constructed using respondents’ descriptions of their experience (over
the twelve months preceding the survey date) with the following three incidents: (1) they feared
crime in their home, (2) something was stolen from their house, and (3) they were attacked. Crime
prevalence assumes values ranging from 0 to 3, corresponding to the number of incidents regarding
which respondents answered in the affirmative. Crime prevalence equals 3 if the respondent
affirms having experienced all three incidents, equals 2 if two of them are reported and so forth.
Data on this variable are from rounds 4–6 of the survey.
Power of chiefs. Respondents were asked how frequently they had contacted local chiefs
during the twelve months preceding the survey date. As a measure of chiefs’ power, we construct
the binary index Chief contact, which is set equal to 1 if the respondent reports contacting a chief
at least once; otherwise, the variable is set equal to 0. Data for this indicator are from rounds 3, 4
and 6 of the Afrobarometer survey.
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4.1.2. Results
Table 5 presents the estimates using all observations in our sample. The order in which
controls are added does not affect the results; therefore, we report only the results with the full set
of controls. The coefficient for Compliance norm is not significant. All the other coefficients are
significant, and they indicate a weaker state capacity among anglophones. Compared to
francophone respondents, anglophone citizens are more likely to report that tax evasion is easier,
extortion activities are prevalent, they experience crime incidents, and they contact chiefs.
Table 6 presents estimation results using observations from western Africa. In Panel A, we
include all of these observations; in Panel B, we use only those observations from the RD region
(i.e. observations from areas within 100 km of the anglophone–francophone national borders). The
coefficients for Compliance norm and Crime prevalence are insignificant in both panels. The
remaining coefficients—for Evasion difficulty, Extortion prevalence, and Chief contact—are all
significant. So except for Crime prevalence, the results reported in both panels are in line with our
previous findings estimated for the entire data set (see Table 5)
The corresponding RD plots are presented in Figure B 1 (see Appendix). Compliance norm
and Crime prevalence do not appear to have a significant discontinuity at the border, reaffirming
the insignificant coefficients in Table 6, For the other variables, the directions of discontinuities in
the RD plots are also consistent with the reported coefficients.
Table 7 presents the RD results from the Cameroon data—that is, the RD observations
from the four administrative regions bordering the francophone–anglophone border in Cameroon
(see Section 3.4). The coefficients for Compliance norm and Extortion prevalence retain their
earlier patterns—the (former) latter continues to be (in)significant. The coefficients for Evasion
difficulty and Chief contact now lose significance while the coefficient for Crime prevalence
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becomes significant. The RD plots are presented in Figure B 2 (see Appendix). The discontinuity
patterns displayed in that figure appear to be consistent with the coefficients estimated in Table 7.
Except for Extortion prevalence and Crime prevalence, which are found to be significant in Table
7 the other variables do not show discernible discontinuities at the border.
Overall, these findings suggest weaker state capacity among anglophones. Given the
relatively large number of outcome variables we examine, it is unsurprising that some of the
estimated relationships between colonial status and these outcome variables are insignificant.
Moreover, our indicators are bound to be imperfect owing to the inherent difficulty of measuring
state capacity. The more important pattern, however, is that all of the significant coefficients
suggest a lower state capacity among anglophones (i.e. weaker tax enforcement, stronger power
of chiefs, and less security).

4.2. Results from Conflict Data
4.2.1 Outcome Variable
The incapacity of weak states to contain armed conflicts often poses a significant security
challenge. Therefore, we examine the prevalence of armed conflicts as an additional outcome. We
use two data sources to construct conflict indicators. The first one is the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset Version 17.1, which reports conflict events along
with information about the date and geolocation (latitude and longitude) of the events (Sundberg
and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2017). The most recent version of this data set covers
the period 1989–2016. Using the information on the longitude and latitude of each conflict event,
we aggregate the conflict data into 0.25 × 0.25 degree cells (approximately 28 km < ) and
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construct conflict indicators at the grid-cell level.23 There are 12,843 such grid cells in all of the
francophone and anglophone countries in our sample (5,513 in the former and 7,330 in the latter).
We then construct indicators for incidence of conflict events in each grid cell. Our conflict variable
(defined at the grid-cell level) is a dummy indicator set equal to 1 if a conflict event occurred in
the grid cell during the 1989–2016 sample period (and set to 0 otherwise).24
The data set also provides information on characteristics of the actors on both sides of the
conflict, such as whether the conflict was between non-state actors (e.g. rebel militias) or whether
it involved the state. We use this information to construct three conflict variables that vary by type
of conflict actors: State violence, Non-state violence, and One-sided violence. One-sided violence
is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if there was a conflict event in which an armed group attacked
unarmed civilians. State violence and Non-state violence represent conflict events in which both
sides were armed. We set State violence to 1 if there was a conflict event involving the state (and
to 0 otherwise); Non-state violence is set to 1 if there was a conflict in which the actors on both
sides were non-state groups.
As a robustness check, we also construct these three indicators using the data provided by
the Armed Conflict Location Events Dataset (ACLED) Version 7 (Raleigh et al., 2010; Raleigh
and Dowd, 2017). One important difference between the two data sets is that UCDP includes
conflict incidents that result in at least one fatality whereas ACLED does not exclude nonfatal
events (such as injuries) from its domain. Hence, the number of conflict events per period tends to
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There is no universally accepted rule on the choice of grid-cell dimensions. For example, (Berman ~al.(2017)Berman, Couttenier, Rohner and
Thoenig), in their study of conflict using the same data sets, aggregate into (0.5 × 0.5)-degree cells. We thus checked robustness of our results by
aggregating the data into 0.5 × 0.5 degree cells. We report the results using 0.25 × 0.25 degree cells because they deliver a more accurate
representation of distance from the borders for our RD analysis.
24
As a robustness check, instead of a dummy for whether any conflict occurred, we used the alternative outcome variables of (a) the number of
conflict events in each cell and (b) the number of years with at least one conflict event. Our results remain the same.
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be larger in ACLED owing to its wider coverage. The most recent version of ACLED covers the
period 1997–2016.25

4.2.2 Results
Table 8 reports regression results on conflict outcomes. Since all of our controls except the
individual-level ones are location-level variables (e.g. ethnicity-level controls), we generate the
same set of controls for the conflict regressions by assigning to each grid cell the values of the
geographic unit to which the grid cell belongs.26 However, distance controls (i.e. distances to the
capital city, the nearest coast, and the border) are reconstructed at the grid level. All of these
controls are included in the regressions. The results are not sensitive to omitting the controls (or
subsets of them). Standard errors are clustered at both ethnicity and country levels.
In Panel A of the table we report the results using all observations; that is, all of the grid
cells in anglophone and francophone countries are included. Panel B includes only the countries
from western Africa, which account for nearly half of the total observations. Finally, Panel C
presents the RD results, for which the sample observations include only those grid cells whose
centroids lie within 100 km of the anglophone–francophone national borders in western Africa.
Figure B 3 presents the RD plots (see Appendix).
The results from all subsamples show that conflict events are more likely to occur in
anglophone regions. The discontinuities revealed by the RD plots are in line with the estimated
coefficients. Thus, the results on armed conflicts also suggest weaker state capacity among
anglophones.

25

See Eck (2012) for a detailed comparison of the two data sets. Whereas UCDP explicitly categorises events into the three categories (state,
non-state, and one-sided violence), ACLED does not directly classify events in that manner. Instead, it provides data on the types of actors
involved, which we use to distinguish between state and non-state violence.
26
A grid cell belongs to a geographic unit (e.g. ethnic homeland or country) if the cell’s centroid lies within the unit’s geographic boundary.

139

5. Conclusion
Building an effective state remains a major challenge for many developing countries. The
literature on colonialism and African history suggests two main reasons why the legacy of
British colonial rule (as compared with French rule) may contribute to weak state capacity. First,
Britain adopted a system of decentralised rule that empowered chiefs over the local population
and instituted a rigid association between an individual’s ethnic identity and access to basic
resources (e.g.

land and local government services). Neither the salience of ethnic identity nor

the power of traditional chiefs were as crucial under French colonial rule. Second, the French
legal system is argued to concentrate more political power in the hands of the central state.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a negative relationship between British rule and
the strength of national identification. Citizens of anglophone (as compared with francophone)
countries report a weaker sense of national identity than of ethnic identity. This finding holds in
the sample of all observations in our data as well as from the RD analysis focusing on observations
near the anglophone–francophone borders, both across countries and within Cameroon.
We also explore the empirical patterns for various indicators related to taxation, security,
and the power of traditional chiefs. All the significant coefficients on these outcomes indicate
lower state capacity among anglophones. Thus, the broad pattern from these results is also one that
associates the legacy of British rule with weaker state capacity.
This evidence highlights the legacy of colonial rule on state building.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs.
Anglo. Franco.
Anglo.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Main outcome variable
National identity
68,807
30,036
Outcome variables on taxation, security and chiefs’ power
Outcome variables from Afrobarometer surveys
Compliance norm
39,270
19,433
Evasion difficulty
35,970
18,131
Extortion prevalence
19,097
8,948
Crime prevalence
55,564
25,390
Chief contact
49,067
20,783
Outcome variables from UCDP and ACLED
State violence (ACLED)
7,330
5,513
State violence (UCDP)
7,330
5,513
Non-state violence (ACLED)
7,330
5,513
Non-state violence (UCDP)
7,330
5,513
One-sided violence (ACLED)
7,330
5,513
One-sided violence (UCDP)
7,330
5,513
Individual controls
Urban
68,807
30,036
Age
68,807
30,036
Employment
68,807
30,036
Male
68,807
30,036
Country controls
West Africa
68,807
30,036
East Africa
68,807
30,036
Former German colony
68,807
30,036
Landlocked
68,807
30,036
Ethnicity and district controls
No. of slaves exported (per km2)
68,807
30,036
Cities in 1800
68,807
30,036
Railway
68,807
30,036
Explorer
68,807
30,036
2
Missionary stations (per km )
68,807
30,036
(*1000) of nighttime light
Density
68,807
30,036
Distance to coast (1,000 km)
68,807
30,036
Distance to capital (1,000 km)
68,807
30,036
Fractionalization
68,807
30,036
Own ethnic share
68,807
30,036
No. of countries
12
9

Mean
Franco.
(4)

Survey
Rounds
(5)

0.42 (0.49)

0.55 (0.50)

3,4,5,6

0.51 (0.50)
0.79 (0.41)
0.13 (0.33)
0.78 (0.94)
0.31 (0.46)

0.58 (0.49)
0.80 (0.40)
0.04 (0.20)
0.57 (0.78)
0.25 (0.43)

5,6
5,6
5
4,5,6
3,4,6

0.14 (0.35)
0.05 (0.21)
0.23 (0.42)
0.05 (0.23)
0.19 (0.39)
0.06 (0.23)

0.08 (0.27)
0.03 (0.16)
0.09 (0.29)
0.01 (0.10)
0.06 (0.24)
0.02 (0.15)

–
–
–
–
–
–

0.35 (0.48)
36.24 (14.59)
0.40 (0.49)
0.50 (0.50)

0.36 (0.48)
38.28 (14.51)
0.27 (0.44)
0.50 (0.50)

3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6

0.26 (0.44)
0.33 (0.47)
0.16 (0.36)
0.33 (0.47)

0.85 (0.36)
0.15 (0.36)
0.07 (0.25)
0.43 (0.49)

–
–
–
–

1.31 (14.59)
0.11 (0.31)
0.47 (0.50)
0.56 (0.50)
0.30 (0.47)
0.50 (0.62)
0.52 (0.32)
0.29 (0.22)
0.12 (0.21)
0.88 (0.25)

5.44 (11.91)
0.16 (0.37)
0.23 (0.42)
0.40 (0.49)
0.12 (0.23)
0.37 (0.44)
0.39 (0.36)
0.27 (0.21)
0.12 (0.23)
0.88 (0.25)

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6

Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of the variables by colonial status (anglophone vs. francophone). Standard deviations are in
parentheses. The control variables are either at individual, ethnicity, district or country levels. Outcome variables on political violence (namely, state,
non-state and one-sided violence) are at the 0.25*0.25 degree grid--cell level. The remaining outcome variables are at individual level. The last column
lists the survey rounds for variables from the Afrobarometer data.
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Table 2: National Identity and Colonial Status
Anglophone
Observations
Within-country R2
Overall R2
Geographic controls
Former German colony
Individual controls
Ethnic controls
District controls

(1)
-0.12**
(0.05)
98,843
0.003
0.022
–
–
–
–
–

(2)
-0.17***
(0.05)
98,843
0.003
0.050
Yes
Yes
–
–
–

(3)
-0.18***
(0.05)
98,843
0.005
0.055
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
–

(4)
-0.14***
(0.04)
98,843
0.005
0.063
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: The dependent variable (National identity) measures the respondents’ strength of national identification.
Anglophone is a dummy for whether the respondent is from an anglophone country. All regressions include
survey-round fixed effects. The geographic controls include indicators for region (western, southern, and
eastern Africa) and ‘landlockedness’. Former German colony is a dummy for whether the country was
colonized by Germany prior to the First World War. Individual-level controls account for age, age squared,
education level, religion, asset ownership, gender, employment status, and location (urban versus rural).
Ethnicity-level controls account for urbanization levels in 1800, precolonial judicial hierarchy, access to
colonial rail network, precolonial contact with European explorers, missionary activity during colonial times,
exposure to slave trade, density of nighttime light, distance to the capital city, and distance to the coast.
District-level controls are the share of the population in own ethnic group and ethnic fractionalization. Robust
standard errors, two-way clustered at country and ethnicity level, are given in parentheses. **Significant at
5\%, ***significant at 1\%.
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Table 3: National Identity and Colonial Status: RD Results for Western Africa
Anglophone
Observations
R2
Geographic controls
Former German colony
Individual controls
Ethnic controls
District controls

(1)
-0.15***
(0.06)
43,013
0.045
–
–
–
–
–

(2)
-0.20***
(0.05)
12,748
0.075
–
–
–
–
–

(3)
-0.20***
(0.05)
12,748
0.076
Yes
–
–
–
–

(4)
-0.22***
(0.05)
12,748
0.084
Yes
Yes
–
–
–

(5)
-0.15**
(0.06)
12,748
0.097
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
–

(6)
-0.14***
(0.05)
12,748
0.102
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Column (1) includes all respondents in western Africa. In columns (2)--(6), the observations are drawn from
respondents who reside within 100 km of anglophone—francophone national borders in western Africa (i.e., the
RD sample). Distance to border is the distance to either side of the nearest anglophone--francophone border. All
regressions include survey-round fixed effects. Legal origin controls includes three dummies: respondents’ trust in
the judiciary, respondents’ attitudes towards political freedom and respondents’ attitudes towards press freedom.
See Table 2 for descriptions of the remaining controls. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the country
and ethnicity levels, are given in parentheses. **Significant at 5\%, *** significant at 1\%.
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Table 4: National Identity and Colonial Status: RD Results for Cameroon
Anglophone
Observations
R2
Geographic controls
Former German colony
Individual controls
Ethnic controls
District controls

(1)
-0.40***
(0.03)
2,230
0.087
–
–
–
–
–

(2)
-0.46***
(0.03)
880
0.213
–
–
–
–
–

(3)
-0.45***
(0.03)
880
0.218
Yes
–
–
–
–

(4)
-0.43***
(0.04)
880
0.251
Yes
Yes
–
–
–

(5)
-0.36***
(0.06)
880
0.296
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
–

(6)
-0.32***
(0.06)
880
0.324
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Column (1) includes all respondents in Cameroon. In columns (2)--(6), the observations are drawn from the
administrative regions near the anglophone--francophone border in Cameroon (see Figure 4). Distance to border is
the distance to either side of the nearest anglophone--francophone border within Cameroon. All regressions
include survey-round fixed effects. Legal origin controls includes three dummies: respondents’ trust in the
judiciary, respondents’ attitudes towards political freedom and respondents' attitudes towards press freedom. See
Table 2 for descriptions of the remaining controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ethnicity level, are
given in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Taxation, Security, and the Power of Chiefs---Results from All Observations

Anglophone
Observations
Within-country R2
Overall R2

Compliance
Norm
(1)
-0.02
(0.06)

Evasion
Difficulty
(2)
-0.04***
(0.02)

Extortion
Prevalence
(3)
0.12***
(0.04)

Crime
Prevalence
(4)
0.16***
(0.06)

Chief
Contact
(5)
0.10***
(0.04)

58,703
0.014
0.028

54,101
0.003
0.019

28,045
0.005
0.030

80,954
0.010
0.032

69,850
0.074
0.111

Note: The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. All regressions include survey-round fixed
effects, geographic controls, the indicator for a Germany colony, and controls at individual, ethnicity, and district
levels (see Table 2 for descriptions of these controls). Standard errors, two-way clustered at the ethnicity and
country levels, are given in parentheses.*** Significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Taxation, Security, and the Power of Chiefs: RD Results for Western Africa

Anglophone

Compliance
Evasion
Extortion
Crime
Norm
Difficulty
Prevalence Prevalence
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: All observations in West Africa
-0.02
-0.08***
0.09***
0.06
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.06)
25,937
0.017

Chief
Contact
(5)
0.09***
(0.04)

Observations
R2

28,214
0.024

13,316
0.075

36,398
0.041

29,440
0.104

Anglophone

Panel B: RD sample
-0.04
-0.10
0.08
(0.08)
(0.03)
(0.03)

0.00
(0.06)

0.10
(0.03)

Observations
R2

10,234
0.044

11,726
0.040

7,900
0.139

9,372
0.024

4,730
0.076

Note: The outcome variables are listed at the top of each column. In Panel B, the observations are drawn from
respondents residing within 100 km of borders between anglophone and francophone countries in western Africa.
All regressions include survey-round fixed effects and the remaining controls at individual, ethnicity, and district
levels (see Table 2). The RD regressions (Panel B) include the RD distance to the border (see Table 3) and border
fixed effects. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the ethnicity and country levels, are given in
parentheses.*** Significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Taxation, Security, and the Power of Chiefs: RD Results for Cameroon

Anglophone
Observations
R2

Compliance
Norm
(1)
0.02
(0.06)

Evasion
Difficulty
(2)
0.02
(0.05)

Extortion
Prevalence
(3)
0.17***
(0.08)

Crime
Prevalence
(4)
0.31***
(0.13)

Chief
Contact
(5)
-0.00
(0.10)

855
0.098

767
0.052

446
0.113

914
0.066

445
0.201

Note: The outcome variables are listed at the top of each column. The observations are drawn from administrative
regions near the anglophone--francophone border in Cameroon (see Figure 4). All regressions include surveyround fixed effects, the RD distance control (see Table 3), and the remaining controls at individual, ethnicity, and
district levels (see Table 2). Robust standard errors, clustered at the ethnicity level, are given in parentheses.**
Significant at 5%.
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Table 8: Colonial Status and Conflict

Anglophone
N = 12,843
Within-country R2
Overall R2
Anglophone
N = 6,193
Overall R2

Anglophone
N = 808
Overall R2

State violence
Nonstate violence
UCDP ACLED
UCDP ACLED
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: All Observations
0.11
0.09
0.11
0.21
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.05)
0.024
0.081

One-sided violence

UCDP
(5)

ACLED
(6)

0.10
(0.05)

0.21
(0.06)

0.055
0.014
0.050
0.139
0.123
0.209
Panel A: Western Africa
0.12
0.11
0.13
0.24
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)

0.021
0.084

0.051
0.197

0.10
(0.05)

0.24
(0.06)

0.082

0.255

0.107

0.241

Panel A: RD Sample
0.04
0.06
0.23
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.06)

0.09
(0.07)

0.23
(0.05)

0.379

0.290

0.14
(0.06)
0.326

0.140

0.148

0.085

0.101

0.227

Note: The units of observations are 0.25*0.25 degree cells. Anglophone is an indicator variable for
whether the cell lies in an anglophone territory. The dependent variables, listed at the top of each
column, are constructed from two different data sets (UCDP and ACLED); these variables are
indicators for whether or not a particular type of conflict (state violence, nonstate violence, or onesided violence) was observed in each cell over the sample period (1989--2016 for UCDP, 1997--2016
for ACLED). Results are reported for three samples. Panel A includes all cells, and Panel B includes
just the cells in western Africa. All of the location-level controls (e.g. ethnicity-level controls; see
Table 2) are included by assigning to each grid cell the values of the geographic unit to which that cell
belongs. Distance controls (distance to the capital city and to the coast) are reconstructed at the grid
level. Panel C reports RD results using cells within 100 km of the anglophone--francophone borders
in western Africa. The RD results include additional controls for distance to the nearest border as well
as border fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ethnicity and country levels, are given
in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Anglophone and Francophone Countries in the Data Set
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Figure 2: Regions for Regression Discontinuity Analysis

Note: The solid lines in this map represent national borders in western Africa, with the anglophonefrancophone borders represented by the thickest lines. The thin broken lines mark the borders of ethnic
groups' historical homelands. The shaded areas are historical homelands of ethnic groups that were split
between anglophone and francophone countries.
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Figure 3: Map of Cameroon

Note: The area circumscribed by the thick solid line represents the region from which observations for our
RD analyses were drawn. The heavy broken line (within that region) marks the anglophone{francophone
border, where the region west (resp. east) of that line is anglophone (resp. francophone). As before, the
thinnest lines indicate borders of ethnic groups' historical homelands; the shaded areas are historical
homelands of ethnic groups that were split between anglophone and francophone Cameroon.
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Figure 4: National Identity in Western Africa, by Distance to Anglophone—Francophone Border

Note: The Figure shows—by distance to border in km—local averages in 10 km bins. The distance from the
francophone—anglophone border increases as we move away from the center point (0). Negative/positive values
represent distance into francophone/anglophone territories (from the border).
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Figure 5: National Identity in Cameroon, by Distance to Anglophone—Francophone Border

Note: The Figure shows—by distance to border in km—local averages in 10 km bins. The distance from the
francophone—anglophone border increases as we move away from the center point (0). Negative/positive values
represent distance into francophone/anglophone territories (from the border).
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Appendix
A. Variables and Data Sources
Afrobarometer Variables
All of the Afrobarometer data are downloaded from the official Afrobarometer website:
http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/merged-data
National identity. An individual-level binary index indicating respondents’ attitudes towards
national versus ethnic identity; see Section 2. Survey questions: Q82 from round 3, Q83 from
round 4, Q85B from round 5, and Q88B from round 6.
Compliance norm. An individual-level binary index reflecting respondents’ views regarding tax
evasion; see Section 3. Survey questions: Q76B from round 5 and Q75B from round 6.
Evasion difficulty. An individual-level binary index that measures respondents’ views about the
difficulty of evading taxes; see Section 3. Survey questions: Q75C from rounds 5 and 6.
Extortion prevalence. An individual-level binary index indicating the prevalence of extortion
activity by non-state actors; see Section 3. Survey question: Q74 from round 5.
Crime prevalence. An individual-level count variable that measures respondents’ experience
with crime incidents; see Section 3. Survey questions: Q9A-C from round 4, Q9B and Q10A-B
from round 5, and Q10B and Q11A-B from round 6.
Chief contact. An individual-level binary index measuring how frequently the respondents
contacted their local chiefs; see Section 3. Survey questions: Q32F from round 3, Q27B from
round 4, and Q24E from round 6.
Urban. An individual-level indicator set equal to 1 if the respondent is from an urban area (and
set to 0 otherwise). Survey questions: URBRUR from rounds 3–6.
Age. Age of the respondent, ranging from 18 to 105. Survey questions: Q1 from rounds 3–6.
Employment. Employment status of the respondent, set equal to 1 if the respondent is employed
(either full-time or part-time) and otherwise set equal to 0. Survey questions: Q94 from rounds 3
and 4, Q96 from round 5, and Q97 from round 6.
Education. Dummies for the respondents’ level of education attainment based on nine education
attainment groups. Survey questions: Q90 from round 3, Q89 from round 4, and Q97 from
rounds 5 and 6.
Religion. Dummies for eight religion groups. Survey questions: Q98A from rounds 3–6.
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Gender. An indicator variable for the respondent’s gender. Survey questions: Q101 from rounds
3–6.
Wealth. Three dummies for the ownership of a radio, a television, or an automobile. Survey
questions: Q92A–C from rounds 3 and 4 and Q90A–C from rounds 5 and 6.
Trust in courts of law. Measures the respondents’ level of trust in courts of law; see Section 2.3.
Survey questions: Q49H from round 3, Q55I from round 4, and Q59J from round 5.
Political freedom to organise Indicator of respondents’ attitudes towards political freedom to
organise; see Section 2.3. Survey questions: Q25 from round 3 and Q19 from rounds 4 and 5.
Press freedom. Indicator of respondents’ attitudes towards press freedom; see Section 2.3.
Survey questions: Q26 from round 3 and Q20 from rounds 4 and 5.
Other Variables
Anglophone. An indicator for whether (or not) the observation is from an anglophone country.
Region indicators. Eastern Africa includes Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Madagascar; western
Africa includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; southern Africa includes Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
This categorisation follows Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
Landlocked. A binary indicator set equal to 1 if the country is landlocked (and set to 0
otherwise).
Former German colony. A dummy variable for Tanzania, Namibia, and Togo— which were
German colonies prior to the First World War.
Share of own ethnic group. A district-level index ranging from 0 to 1; it measures the share of
the district’s population that is of same ethnicity as the respondent. This index is calculated (from
Afrobarometer data) following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
Ethnic fractionalisation. A district-level index ranging from 0 to 1; it measures the probability
that two randomly selected individuals from a district belong to different ethnic groups. This
index is calculated (from Afrobarometer data) following Alesina et al. (2003).
Slave export. Total slave export count, from both trans-Atlantic and Indian trade, for each ethnic
group. Source: Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
Cities in 1800. An indicator for whether (or not) the focal ethnic group’s historical homeland
contained a city populated by at least 20,000 inhabitants in 1800. Source: Chandler and Fox
(1974).
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Historical homelands of ethnic groups. Provided by the digital version of Mur- dock’s (1959)
Ethnolinguistic Map. Land area of each ethnic homeland is computed using the ‘shapefile’ from
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
Railway indicator. A dummy variable for whether (or not) there was a colonial railway station
within the focal ethnic group’s historical homeland. Source: Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
European explorers. An indicator variable for whether (or not) European explorers passed
through the focal ethnic group’s historical homeland during the precolonial era. Source: Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011).
Missionary activity. The number of mission stations located in the focal ethnic group’s historical
homeland. Source: Nunn (2010).
Light density. Average of night-time light density per square kilometre within the focal ethnic
group’s historical homeland. Source:
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
Judicial hierarchy. The number of jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local community.
Sources: Murdock (1967) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
Distance to capital city. Distance between (the centroid of) each ethnic homeland and the capital
city. Data on capital cities are from the Natural Earth database:
http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/
Distance to coast. The distance between the centroid of the focal ethnic homeland and the
nearest coast.
Conflict indicators. Three dummy variables—State violence, Non-state violence, and One-sided
violence—are constructed, at the (0.25 0.25)-degree–cell level, using data from ACLED and
UCDP. Each of these conflict variables indicates whether the respective type of violence
occurred in each cell over the period covered by the two data sets; see Section 3.2. Sources: for
UCDP, Sundberg and Melander (2013) and Croicu and Sundberg (2017); for ACLED, Raleigh et
al. (2010) and Raleigh and Dowd (2017).
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B. Figures
Figure B.1: RD Plots for Taxation, Security and the Power of Chiefs, by Distance to
Anglophone—Francophone Borders in West Africa

Note: The Figure shows—by distance to border in km—local averages in 10 km bins. The distance from the
francophone—anglophone border increases as we move away from the center point (0). Negative/positive values
represent distance into francophone/anglophone territories (from the border).
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Figure B.2: State Violence, Non-State Violence and One-Sided Violence from UCDP and
ACLED Data Sets, by Distance to the Anglophone—Francophone Border in West Africa.
UCDP

ACLED

Note: The Figure shows—by distance to border in km—local averages in 20 km bins. The distance from the
francophone—anglophone border increases as we move away from the center point (0). Negative/positive values represent
distance into francophone/anglophone territories (from the border).
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Figure B.3: RD Plots for Taxation, Security and the Power of Chiefs, by Distance to
Anglophone—Francophone Borders in Cameroon

Note: The Figure shows—by distance to border in km—local averages in 10 km bins. The distance from the
francophone—anglophone border increases as we move away from the center point (0). Negative/positive values
represent distance into francophone/anglophone territories (from the border).
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